Method and apparatus for preventing illegal copy or illegal installation of information of optical recording medium

ABSTRACT

A recording and reproducing system for performing the reproduction using an optical recording medium. A physical feature of a ROM type disk is extracted and enciphered before being recorded in an optical disk. The cipher reproduced and converted into a plain text physical feature, which in turn, is compared with the physical feature information detected from the ROM disk. When both are coincident with each other, the operation of the system stops, thereby preventing the use of an illegally duplicated disk. The physical feature information, recorded on a magnetic recording layer 4 of the optical recording medium 2, is reproduced by an optical head 8 and compared with the information measured by a physical feature information detector, thereby detecting a duplicated medium.

This is a continuation-in-part, of a copending U.S. patent applicationSer. No. 08/281,337, filed Jul. 27, 1994 by one of the applicants of thepresent application.

BACKGROUND OF THE INVENTION

1. Industrial Application Field

The present invention relates to prevention of illegal copies ofdisc-like optical recording media and prevention of illegal install ofinformation into information processing systems or the like, and moreparticularly to a method and system for preventing recorded music onoptical disks, as well as projected images and various sorts ofprograms, such as game softwares (softs) and computer softwares, frombeing illegally copied and utilized without permission of thecopyrighters, and further relates to an optical recording mediumincapable of copy.

2. Description of the Prior Art

In recent years, optical disks are widely being employed in a variety offields. The optical disks are generally classified into record-possibleRAM disks and record-impossible ROM disks, while the manufacturing costof the RAM disks is from five times to ten times that of the ROM disks.Accordingly, the ROM disks tend to be chiefly used in applications thatsupply a large number of people with a large quantity of information,for example, an electronic publication application and a mediumcost-limited application that supplies music softwares and projectedimage softwares. On the other hand, as obvious from CD-ROM game machinesand CD-ROM contained personal computers, there is a need for a RAMfunction being incorporated into the ROM disks, as an extension is morebeing made to interactive use. Home-use systems seldom require a largeRAM capacity, for which reason great interest is focused on the adventof a new medium concept capable of realizing the three conditions: asmall capacity RAM function, a large capacity ROM function, and a lowcost. In addition, illegal duplicates of ROM disks such as CDs arerecently put in the market so that the copyrighters suffer seriousdamage. Thus, a countermeasure has been needed for the duplicateprevention. Moreover, a soft distribution method has come into widespread use where a plurality of encrypted (enciphered) programs areincorporated into disks and decrypted (deciphered) through passwords,and for improving the security of the password there is a need for adifferent ID number being recorded in each ROM.

One possible way to realize this concept is that one magnetic recordinglayer is equipped on the rear surface of a ROM disk, in which case theformation cost of the recording layer is less than one-tenth that of theROM disk itself, thus realizing a partial RAM disk without greatlyraising the cost of the ROM disk. Actually, as disclosed in JapanesePatent Laid-Open Nos. 56-163536, 57-6446, 57-212642, 2-179951, in termsof ROM disks such as CD-ROM not having a cartridge, there have alreadybeen proposed approaches wherein an optical recording section isprovided on a front surface of a CD-ROM and a magnetic recording sectionis added on the rear surface thereof. In addition, Japanese PatentLaid-Open No. 60-70543 discloses an attempt to accomplish magneticrecording by means of a combination of a disk wherein, like opticaldisks of amorphous material, an optical recording section, made of anonmagnetic material, is placed on its surface and a magnetic recordinglayer is located on its rear surface and a magnetic head which isequipped in a mechanical section facing the rear surface.

On the other hand, for the duplicate prevention, only means is knownwhich is made to manufacture a special disk through a special process,such as intentionally making a cut or openwork on the disk, so thatdifficulty is encountered to manufacture it without a specialmanufacturing apparatus.

However, the aforesaid methods are merely based on a combination of amagnetic recording section and an optical recording section, while notcontaining the important requirements for definite realization of theequipment at all, such as the ways of avoiding the mutual interferencebetween the optical recording section and magnetic recording section,permitting access to magnetic tracks with a simple arrangement, sharinga circuit, protecting magnetically recorded information on media fromthe external environment including magnetism and abrasion without theuse of a cartridge, compressing information to be recorded in a RAMarea, accelerating the access, and concretely making out a physicaltrack format.

Furthermore, in the prior art examples, disclosure is hardly made interms of the ways of realizing a home-use partial RAM disk in a concreteform, such as the method of mass-producing media at a low cost, which isimportant in realization of the media, and the method of making themedia conformable with the CD standards. Therefore, there remains aproblem which arises with the conventional examples in that difficultyis experienced in concrete realization of media and systems capable ofhome use.

SUMMARY OF THE INVENTION

The present invention is for eliminating above-described problems, andit is therefore a first object of the present invention to provide amethod, system and medium which can realize a ROM type partial RAM diskand system without the use of a cartridge like a CD-ROM.

A second object of this invention is to provide a duplicate-preventingdisk and system capable of preventing illegal duplicate through a waysuch as changing the physical arrangement of addresses, but not throughthe special method proposed heretofore.

For achieving these purposes, according to this invention, when anoptical disk enters in a manufacturing step, first physical featureinformation indicative of a physical feature including at least atwo-dimensional pit arrangement or pit configuration is encrypted andoptically or magnetically written in advance in such a manner as beingdistinguishable from the main information to be recorded in the opticaldisk, before, i.e., when being in reproduction, read out to bedeciphered. At this reproduction, a physical feature of the optical diskis additionally measured to obtain second physical feature information.The second physical feature information is checked (collated) with thefirst physical feature information so as to make a decision as towhether or not a specific relationship is present therebetween. When thesecond physical feature information is not in the specific relation tothe first physical feature information, the operation of a specificprogram read out from the optical disk is made to stop, the reading-outof the information is designed to stop afterwards, or a given process ofthe read information by a signal processing means is adapted to stop.

That is, according to this invention, there is provided an informationreproducing system comprising means (17) for rotationally driving adisc-like optical recording medium (2) wherein information is recordedin the form of pits, an optical head (6) for reading out the recordedinformation from the optical recording medium, head-moving means (23)for making the optical head movable radially of the optical recordingmedium, and signal processing means for processing the information readout through the optical head, which system is characterised byincluding:

first physical information detecting means (743, 38, 665) for detectingon the basis of information read out through the optical head or amagnetic head first physical feature information (532) which isrepresentative of a physical feature including at least atwo-dimensional pit arrangement or pit configuration on the opticalrecording medium and which is encrypted and recorded at manufacturing ofthe optical recording medium;

decryption means (534) for decrypting the first physical featureinformation;

means (17a, 6, 38, 703a) for measuring a physical feature of the opticalrecording medium to obtain second physical feature information;

check means (535) for checking the second physical feature informationwith the first physical feature information to make a decision as towhether or not both are in a specific relation to each other; and

control means (717, 665) for, when the check means decides that thesecond physical feature information is not in the specific relation tothe first physical feature information, stopping the operation of aspecific program read out from the optical recording medium, forstopping the reading-out of information from the optical recordingmedium afterwards, or for stopping a given process of information, readout from the optical recording medium, the given process being practicedby the signal processing means.

Moreover, according to this invention, there is provided an informationrecording system which is characterised by comprising:

encryption means (537) for encrypting, using a one direction function,first physical feature information (532) indicative of a physicalfeature including at least a two-dimensional pit arrangement or pitconfiguration on a disc-like optical recording medium; and

recording means (37, 6, 23, 24, 17, 26, 10) for recording the encryptedfirst physical feature information on the optical recording medium or anoriginal record therefor so that the encrypted first physical featureinformation is distinguishable from main information to be recorded onthe optical recording medium.

In addition, according to this invention, there is provided a method ofmanufacturing a disc-like optical recording medium, which comprises thesteps of:

recognizing first physical feature information (532) representative of aphysical feature at least including a two-dimensional pit arrangement ora pit configuration on the disc-like optical recording medium;

encrypting the first physical feature information by using a onedirection function; and

recording the encrypted first physical feature information on theoptical recording medium or an original record therefor so that theencrypted first physical feature information is distinguishable frommain information to be recorded on the optical recording medium.

Furthermore, according to this invention, there is provided a disc-likeoptical recording medium which is manufactured through the steps ofrecognizing first physical feature information (532) representative of aphysical feature at least including a two-dimensional pit arrangement ora pit configuration on the disc-like optical recording medium,encrypting the first physical feature information by using a onedirection function; and recording the encrypted first physical featureinformation on the optical recording medium or an original recordtherefor so that the encrypted first physical feature information isdistinguishable from main information to be recorded on the opticalrecording medium.

Still further, there is provided a method of preventing an illegal copyof a disc-like optical recording medium or of preventing an illegalinstall of information on the disc-like optical recording medium, whichcomprises the steps of detecting on the basis of information read outfrom the optical recording medium first physical feature information(532) which is representative of a physical feature including at least atwo-dimensional pit arrangement or pit configuration on the opticalrecording medium and which is encrypted and recorded by using a onedirection function at manufacturing of the optical recording medium;

decrypting the first physical feature information;

measuring a physical feature of the optical recording medium to obtainsecond physical feature information;

checking the second physical feature information with the first physicalfeature information to make a decision as to whether or not both are ina specific relation to each other; and

when the check step decides that the second physical feature informationis not in the specific relation to the first physical featureinformation, stopping the operation of a specific program read out fromthe optical recording medium, stopping the reading-out of informationfrom the optical recording medium afterwards, or stopping a givenprocess of information, read out from the optical recording medium, thegiven process being practiced by signal processing means.

Moreover, there is provided a method of preventing an illegal copy of adisc-like optical recording medium or of preventing an illegal installof information on the disc-like optical recording medium, whichcomprises the steps of:

detecting first physical feature information (532) from the opticalrecording medium, the first physical feature information beingindicative of a physical feature at least including a two-dimensionalpit arrangement or a pit configuration on the optical recording medium,encrypted using a one direction function and recorded on the opticalrecording medium or an original record therefor so as to bedistinguishable from main information to be recorded on the opticalrecording medium;

decrypting the first physical feature information;

measuring a physical feature of the optical recording medium to obtain asecond physical feature information;

checking the second physical feature information with the first physicalfeature information to make a decision as to whether or not both are ina specific relation to each other; and

when the check step decides that the second physical feature informationis not in the specific relation to the first physical featureinformation, stopping the operation of a specific program read out fromthe optical recording medium, stopping the reading-out of informationfrom the optical recording medium afterwards, or stopping a givenprocess of information, read out from the optical recording medium, thegiven process being practiced by signal processing means.

Contents of This Specification

This specification contains detailed descriptions of many embodiments,and a table of the brief contents thereof is herein appended as follows.

Summary of the Invention

Brief Description of the Drawings

Description of Reference Marks

Table of Contents of the Embodiments and Corresponding Drawings

First Embodiment

Second Embodiment

Third Embodiment

Fourth Embodiment

Fifth Embodiment

Sixth Embodiment

Seventh Embodiment

Eighth Embodiment

Ninth Embodiment

Tenth Embodiment

Eleventh Embodiment

Twelfth Embodiment

Thirteenth Embodiment

fourteenth Embodiment

BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

FIG. 1 is a block diagram showing a mastering apparatus for a recordingsystem according to a preferred second embodiment of this invention;

FIG. 2A is an illustration of variation of linear velocity with time atrecording in the second embodiment;

FIG. 2B is an illustration of address locations on an optical disk at1.2 m/s in the second embodiment;

FIG. 2C is an illustration of address locations on an optical disk at1.2 m/s→1.4 m/s;

FIG. 3A is an illustration of a physical arrangement of addresses of alegal CD in the second embodiment;

FIG. 3B is an illustration of a physical arrangement of addresses of anillegally duplicated CD in the second embodiment;

FIG. 4 consists of FIG. 4(a) is an illustration of the relationshipbetween rotational pulses for a disk and time in the second embodiment;

FIG. 4(b) is an illustration of the relationship between a physicalposition signal and time in the second embodiment;

FIG. 4(c) is an illustration of the relationship between addressinformation and time;

FIG. 5 is an illustration for describing a duplicate preventingprinciple for a CD in the second embodiment;

FIG. 6 is a block diagram showing a recording and reproducing systemaccording to the second embodiment;

FIG. 7 is a flow chart for check of an illegally duplicated disk in thesecond embodiment;

FIG. 8A is a process illustration of a CD with an ID number recorded ina first embodiment;

FIG. 8B is an illustration of an process for a prior art CD;

FIG. 9A is a top view of a magnetizing device in the first embodiment;

FIG. 9B is a side elevational view showing a magnetizing device in thesecond embodiment;

FIG. 9C is an enlarged side elevational view showing the magnetizingdevice in the second embodiment;

FIG. 9D is a block diagram showing the magnetizing device in the secondembodiment;

FIG. 10 is an illustration of the principle of ID number input in thefirst embodiment;

FIG. 11A is an illustration of the relationship between a linearvelocity and time at a constant linear velocity in the secondembodiment;

FIG. 11B is an illustration of the relationship between a linearvelocity and time at variation of the linear velocity in the secondembodiment;

FIG. 11C is an illustration of a physical arrangement of addresses at aconstant linear velocity in the second embodiment;

FIG. 11D is an illustration of a physical arrangement of addresses atvariation of the linear velocity in the second embodiment;

FIG. 12A is a cross-sectional view of a legal original record in thesecond embodiment;

FIG. 12B is a cross-sectional view showing a legally formed disk in thesecond embodiment;

FIG. 12C is a cross-sectional view showing an illegally duplicatedoriginal record in the second embodiment;

FIG. 12D is a cross-sectional view showing an illegally duplicatedformed disk in the second embodiment;

FIG. 13 is a block diagram showing a CD fabricating device and recordingand reproducing system in the second embodiment;

FIG. 14 is a flow chart of the second embodiment;

FIG. 15 an illustration of an address arrangement on a disk originalrecord in the second, fourth and seventh embodiments;

FIG. 16 is a block diagram showing a recording and reproducing system inthe second embodiment;

FIG. 17A is a cross-sectional view showing an illegal disk in a thirdembodiment;

FIG. 17B is a cross-sectional view showing a legal disk in the thirdembodiment;

FIG. 17C is an illustration of a waveform of an optical regenerativesignal in the third embodiment;

FIG. 17D is an illustration of a digital signal in the third embodiment;

FIG. 17E is an illustration of an envelope waveform in the thirdembodiment;

FIG. 17F is an illustration of a digital waveform in the thirdembodiment;

FIG. 17G is an illustration of a waveform of a detection signal in thethird embodiment;

FIG. 18 illustrates a disk physical arrangement table in the thirdembodiment;

FIG. 19A is an illustration of an address arrangement on an optical diskwhich is not in an eccentric condition, in the third embodiment;

FIG. 19B is an illustration of an address arrangement of an optical diskwhich is in an eccentric condition, in the third embodiment;

FIG. 20A is an illustration of tracking displacement of a legal disk inthe third embodiment;

FIG. 20B is an illustration of tracking displacement of an illegallyduplicated disk in the third embodiment;

FIG. 21A shows an address An in the third embodiment;

FIG. 21B illustrates an angle Zn in the third embodiment;

FIG. 21C shows an tracking displacement Tn in the third embodiment;

FIG. 21D illustrates a pit depth Dn in the third embodiment;

FIG. 22 is illustrative of a laser output, pit depth and regenerativesignal in the third embodiment;

FIG. 23 is illustrative of a duplicate preventing effect relating toeach original record fabricating apparatus in the second and thirdembodiments;

FIG. 24 is a block diagram showing an original record fabricatingapparatus in the second and third embodiments;

FIG. 25 is a block diagram showing an original record fabricatingapparatus in the second and third embodiments;

FIG. 26 is a block diagram showing an original record fabricatingapparatus in the second and third embodiments;

FIG. 27 is a block diagram showing an original record fabricatingapparatus in the second and third embodiments;

FIG. 28 is a block diagram showing an original record fabricatingapparatus in the second and third embodiments;

FIG. 29 is a block diagram wholly showing an original record fabricatingsystem in the second and third embodiments;

FIG. 30A is an illustration of a waveform of a laser output in the thirdembodiment;

FIG. 30B is an illustration of a waveform of a laser output in the thirdembodiment;

FIG. 30C is a cross-sectional view showing a substrate in the thirdembodiment;

FIG. 30D is a cross-sectional view showing a substrate in the thirdembodiment;

FIG. 30E is a cross-sectional view showing a formed disk in the thirdembodiment;

FIG. 31 is an illustration of the relationship between an laserrecording output and regenerative signal in the third embodiment;

FIG. 32 is illustrative of a process for an original recordingfabrication in the third embodiment;

FIG. 33A is a top view showing a fabricated original record in the thirdembodiment;

FIG. 33B is a transverse cross-sectional view showing a press die for anoriginal record in the third embodiment;

FIG. 34 illustrates a process for an original record fabrication in thethird embodiment;

FIG. 35A is a top view showing a fabricated original record in the thirdembodiment;

FIG. 35B is a transverse cross-sectional view showing an original recordand press die in the third embodiment;

FIG. 36 is a flow chart showing a process for fabricating an originalrecord and for manufacturing a recording medium in the third embodiment;

FIG. 37 is a flow chart showing a disk check method in the thirdembodiment;

FIG. 38 is a block diagram showing disk formation in the thirdembodiment;

FIG. 39 is a block diagram showing a low-reflection portion positiondetecting section in the third embodiment;

FIG. 40 is a block diagram showing a recording and reproducing system inthe third embodiment;

FIG. 41A is a top view of a disk in a fourth embodiment;

FIG. 41B is a top view of a disk in the first embodiment;

FIG. 41C is a top view of a disk in the first embodiment;

FIG. 41D is a transverse cross-sectional view showing a disk in thefirst embodiment;

FIG. 41E is an illustration of a waveform of a regenerative signal inthe first embodiment;

FIG. 42 illustrates a principle for position detection of an address andclock of a low-reflection portion in a fourth embodiment;

FIG. 43 is an illustration of comparison between low-reflection portionaddress tables of a legal disk and duplicated disk in the fourthembodiment;

FIG. 44 is a flow chart showing a disk check using a one directionfunction in the second, third and fourth embodiments;

FIG. 45 is an illustration of coordinate positions of original recordsin the second embodiment;

FIG. 46 is a flow chart of a low-reflection position detection programin the fourth embodiment;

FIG. 47 is a flow illustration of a manufacturing method of alow-reflection portion in the fourth embodiment;

FIG. 48 is a flow illustration of a manufacturing method of alow-reflection portion in the fourth embodiment;

FIG. 49 is a flow illustration of a manufacturing method of alow-reflection portion in the fourth embodiment;

FIG. 50 is a flow illustration of a manufacturing method of alow-reflection portion in the fourth embodiment;

FIG. 51 is a top view showing a disk in the fourth embodiment;

FIG. 52 shows a data structure of a master cipher in a six embodiment;

FIG. 53 is an illustration of physical formation in the six embodiment;

FIG. 54 is an illustration of a principle for duplicate detection by anerror CP code in a fifth embodiment;

FIG. 55 is an illustration of a principle for duplicate detection by anEFM patent code in a fifth embodiment;

FIG. 56 is an illustration of a duplicate preventing EFM conversiontable in the fifth embodiment;

FIG. 57 is a flow chart showing a selection method of a plurality ofsub-cipher encoders in the sixth embodiment;

FIG. 58 is a flow chart showing an install allowing method in the sixthembodiment;

FIG. 59 is a principle illustration of a disk based on a duplicatepreventing method using an optical mark in the first embodiment;

FIG. 60 shows a manufacturing process of a low-reflection portion of anoptical disk in a seventh embodiment;

FIG. 61 illustrates a manufacturing process of first and secondlow-reflection portions in the seventh embodiment;

FIG. 62A is a block diagram showing a recording and reproducing systembased on an off-track method in an eighth embodiment;

FIG. 62B is an illustration of tracking in an on-track conditionaccording to an off-track method in the eighth embodiment;

FIG. 62C is an illustration of tracking in an off-track condition due toan off-track method in the eighth embodiment;

FIG. 63 is an principle illustration of a duplicate preventing methodbased on a combination of an arrangement angle detecting method and anoff-track signal method in the eighth embodiment;

FIG. 64A is a top view showing a foreign material arrangement on a labelsurface of a CD in a ninth embodiment;

FIG. 64B shows a displaying state of a CD in a display section in theninth embodiment;

FIG. 65 illustrates a displaying state state of an error message in adisplay section in the ninth embodiment;

FIG. 66 is a flow chart showing a cleaning display in the ninthembodiment;

FIG. 67 is an illustration of a manufacturing process of a bar code dueto cutting in the seventh embodiment;

FIG. 68 is an illustration of a manufacturing process of first andsecond reflection films in the seventh embodiment;

FIG. 69 is a block diagram showing a magnetic recording system in aneleventh embodiment;

FIG. 70 is a flow chart showing an operation of the eleventh embodiment;

FIG. 71 is a flow chart showing an operation of the eleventh embodiment;

FIG. 72 is a flow chart showing an operation of the eleventh embodiment;

FIG. 73 is a flow chart showing an operation of the eleventh embodiment;

FIG. 74 is a flow chart showing an operation of the eleventh embodiment;

FIG. 75 is a flow chart showing an operation of the eleventh embodiment;

FIG. 76 is an illustration of a data hierarchical structure of a ROMsection and RAM section of an optical disk in the eleventh embodiment;

FIG. 77 is a block diagram showing an image encoding section in antwelfth embodiment;

FIG. 78 is a block diagram showing an image compressing encoder in thetwelfth embodiment;

FIG. 79 is a flow chart showing an operation of the twelfth embodiment;

FIG. 80 is a flow chart showing an install program in the firstembodiment;

FIG. 81 is an illustration of display on a screen in the firstembodiment;

FIG. 82 is a block diagram showing a recording and reproducing systemaccording to the first embodiment;

FIG. 83 is a flow chart showing encryption in a thirteenth embodiment;

FIG. 84 is a flow chart showing a main cipher in the thirteenthembodiment;

FIG. 85 is a flow chart showing a reflecting film recording routine inthe thirteenth embodiment;

FIG. 86 is a flow chart at disk reproduction in the thirteenthembodiment;

FIG. 87 is a flow chart showing a decryption in the thirteenthembodiment;

FIG. 88A is a block diagram showing a mastering apparatus in afourteenth embodiment;

FIG. 88B is a block diagram showing a mastering apparatus in afourteenth embodiment;

FIG. 89 is a flow chart showing formation of an original record in thefourteenth embodiment;

FIG. 90 is a block diagram showing an information processing unit in thefourteenth embodiment;

FIG. 91 is a flow chart at information reproduction in the fourteenthembodiment;

FIG. 92 shows a reproduction principle of an in-phase signal in theeighth embodiment;

FIG. 93A is illustrative of the principle of a two-point coincidencesystem in the eighth embodiment;

FIG. 93B is illustrative of the principle of a three-point coincidencesystem in the eighth embodiment;

FIG. 94 is illustrative of four-point coincidence system in the eighthembodiment;

FIG. 95 is a first flow chart in the thirteenth embodiment;

FIG. 96 is a second flow chart in the thirteenth embodiment; and

FIG. 97 is a top view showing a second low-reflection portion in theseventh embodiment.

Reference marks used in the drawings will be described hereinbelow forreference.

1 recording and reproducing system

2 recording medium

2M original record

3 magnetic recording layer

4 optical recording layer

5 optical transmission layer

6, 6M optical head

7 optical recording block

8 magnetic head

8a main magnetic pole

8b magnetic sub-pole

8c head cap

8e uniform magnetic field area

8m magnetic field modulation magnetic head

8s cancelling magnetic head

9 magnetic recording block

10M system control section

17, 17M motor

18 optical head

19 head base

23, 23M head moving actuator

23a traverse actuator

24a traverse movement circuit

24M tracking circuit

30 memory

34a memory (for system)

37 optical recording circuit

37a time base circuit

37b optical recording section

37c optical output section

37d combination section

38 frame synchronizing signal

38a clock reproduction circuit

40 coil

40a magnetic field modulation coil

40b magnetic recording coil

40c tap

40d tap

40e tap

41 slider

42 disk cassette

43 printing ground layer

44 printing area

45 printing

46 pit

47 substrate

48 optical reflective layer

49 printing ink

50 protective layer

51 arrow

52 optical recording signal

54 lens

57 light-emitting section

60 adhesive layer

61 magnetic recording signal

65 optical track

66 focal point

67 magnetic track

67a recording magnetic track

67b reproduction magnetic track

67s servo magnetic track

67f guard band

67g guard band

67x cleaning track

69 high μ magnetic layer

70 head gap

70a recording head gap

70b reproduction head gap

81 interference layer

84 reflective layer

85 modulated magnetic field

85a magnetic flux

85b magnetic flux

150 coupling section

201 decision step

202 reproduction step

203 reproduction copy step

204 reproduction dedicated step

205 recording copy step

206 recording step

207 copy step

210 demagnetizing area

210a demagnetizing area

210b demagnetizing area

301 shutter

302 head hole

303 liner hole

304 liner

305 liner supporting section

305a movable section

305b sub-liner supporting section

305c liner elevating section

307 channel

307a liner driving channel

310 liner pin

311 liner pin guide

312 pin driving lever

313 recognition hole

314 protective pin

315 liner driving section

316 pin shaft

317 spring

318 coupling portion

319 pin shutter

320 optical address

321a center

321b center

321c center

322 optical data train

323 address

324 data

325 guard band

326 track group

327 block

328 track data

328 synchronizing signal

329 address

330 parity

331 data

333 separation circuit

334 modulation circuit

335 disk circuit angle detecting section

336 eccentricity correction memory

337 signal-free area

338 traverse control section

339 table showing correspondence between optical address and magneticaddress

340 head amplifier

341 demodulator

342 error check section

343 data separation section

344 AND circuit

345 recording data

346 light-free address area

347 optical address area

348 magnetic TOC area

349 track locus

350 head reproduction section

351 memory data

352 coating material barrel

353 coating material transfer roll

354 intaglio drum

355 etching section

356 scriber

357 soft transfer roll

358 coating section

360 magnetic shield

361 resin section

362 random magnetic field generator

363 traverse shaft

363b magnetic head traverse shaft

364 positional reference section

365 disk lock section

366 traverse coupling section

367 traverse gear

367c magnetic head traverse gear

368 reference table

369 synchronizing section

370 recording format

371 track number section

372 data section

373 CRC section

374 gap portion

375 guide section for coupling section

376 disk cleaning section

377 magnetic head cleaning section

378 noise canceller

380 coupling section for disk cleaning section

381 magnetic sensor

382 optical reduction clock signal

383 magnetic lock signal

384 magnetic recording signal

385 decision window time

386 optical sensor

387 optical mark

387a bar code

388 light-transmitting section

389 upper cover

390 cassette cover

391 magnetic plane shutter

392 shutter coupling section

393 cassette cover rotary shaft

394 insertion opening

395 tape

396 label section

397 buzzer

398 magnetic recording area

399 screen printer

400 bar code printer

401 high Hc section

402 magnetic section

402a space section

403 magnetic section

404 key managing table

405 step of flow chart

406 key releasing decoder

407 voice extension block

408 personal computer

409 hard disk

410 install step

411 application

412 OS

413 BIOS

414 drive

415 interface

416 step of flow chart

321 optical file

422 magnetic file

436 network BIOS

437 LAN network

447 step of flow chart

447a step of flow chart

448 corrected data

449 display

450 key pad

451 error correction step

452 parity

453 C1 parity

454 C2 parity

455 Index

456 sub-code synchronism detecting section

457 index detecting section

458 divider

459 magnetic synchronizing signal detecting section

460 shortest/longest pulse detecting section

461 pseudo optical synchronizing signal generating section

462 pseudo magnetic synchronizing signal generating section

463 optical synchronizing signal detector

464 divider/multiplier

465 change-over switch

466 waveform shaping section

467 clock reproducing section

468 medium identifier

469 optical address information

470 data

514 spring

514a head elevation coupling means

514a head elevation inhibiting means

514c optical head travelling area

516 loading motor

517 loading gear

518 tray moving gear

519 head elevator

520 tray

521 opening and closing shaft for upper cover

522 menu image planeΩselection number table

523 playback control information

524 step of flow chart

525 list ID offset table

526 optical search information

527 magnetic track search information

528 master data

529 mastering device

530 data arrangement

531 Zone

532 physical arrangement (configuration) table (first physical featureinformation)

533 illegal disk check circuit

534 cipher decoder

535 check circuit

536 output/operation stopping means

537 cipher encoder

538 cipher signal

539 physical position

540 magnetizing device

541 magnetizing device

542 magnetizing device

543 magnetizing current generator

544 current direction switching device

545a coil

546 ID number generator

547 mixer

548 separation key

549 separator

550 ID number

551 step of flow chart

552 physical arrangement signal

553 angular position detecting section

554 tracking amount detecting section

555 pit depth detecting section

556 measured disk physical arrangement table

557 disk center

558 rotational center of disk

559 eccentric portion

560 pit

561 duplicate pit

562 pulse signal

563 duplicate preventing signal

564 tracking modulation signal generating section

565 copy preventing (protection) signal generating section

566 optical output modulation signal generating section

567 optical output modulating section

568 pulse duration modulating section

569 pulse duration adjusting section

570 output address information section

571 time base (axis) changing section

572 original record

573 photosensitive layer

574 photosensitive section

575 metallic original record

576 formed disk

577 second photosensitive section

578 communication interface section

579 external cipher decoder

580 pit group

581 reproduced waveform

582 random extractor

583 random number generating section

565 image plane

566 step (flow chart of step virtual file)

567 window

568 holder

569 file

570 CD-ROM icon

571 CD-ROM-RAM icon

572 HDD

573 invisible file

574 invisible folder

575 display

576 stereo-capacity display

577 virtual capacity display

578 password input section

579 file name input section

584 low-reflection section

585 reference low-reflection section

586 low-reflection light quantity detecting section

587 light quantity level comparator

588 light quantity reference value

589 HPF

590 waveform shaping circuit

590a AGC

591 demodulating section

592 EFM

593 physical address output section

594 address output section

595 synchronizing signal output section

596 low-reflection section addressΩclock number position signal outputsection

597 n-1 address output section

598 clock counter

599 low-reflection section start/end position detecting section

600 low-reflection section position detecting section

601 low-reflection section angular position signal output section

602 low-reflection section angular position detecting section

603 n-1 address signal

604 synchronizing signal

605 low-reflection section start point

606 low-reflection section end point

607 time-delay correcting section

608 reference delay time TD measuring section

609 low-reflection sectionΩaddress table

610 vapor deposition preventing section

611 protective layer

612 ink

613 light shielding section

614 adhesive section

615 first mask

616 second mask

617 printing section

618 CP optical mark section

620 bar code

621 bar code demodulating section

622 character pattern

623 heating section

624 heating head

625 film

626 disk physical ID

627 stamper physical ID

628 disk managing ID

629 master cipher

630 written layer

631 error sign-address table

632 CP error sign

633 physical ID output section

634 error sign list

635 standard sign

635 CPEFM conversion table

637 original data

638 decode data

639 CP special sign

640 CP special sign detecting section

641 CP special sign address output section

642 CP special sign-address table

643 laser trimming device

644 laser beam deflecting device

645 off-track switching circuit

646 track servo polarity inverting section

647 off-track signal reproducing section

648 optical sensor

649 optical beam spot

650 inphase reproduction signal

651 negative-phase reproduction signal

652 inphase reproduction signal

653 inphase signal block

654 frame sync signal

655 foreign substance

656 pulse duration modulation signal demodulating section

657 reproduction output detecting section

658 reproduction output reference value

659 reproduction output lowering section

660 offset voltage detecting section

661 switching section

662 2 demodulators

663 2 personal computers

664 network

665 CPU

666 step (install program)

667 step (legal disk check routine)

668 step (machine ID check making-out recording routine)

669 step (legal cipher decoder check routine)

670 step (routine for stepping use of illegal copy soft)

671 step (program executing routine)

672 step (routine for stopping same ID number soft)

673 step (program movement detecting step)

674 step (machine ID check step)

675 step (cipher decoder check routine)

676 personal computer

677 CD-ROM layer

678 virtual ROM layer

679 write-once layer

680 recording layer

700 original record

701 recording layer

703 physical feature information measuring section

704 physical feature information transmitting section

705 physical feature information receiving section

706 plain text information output section

707 first recording area

708 second recording area

709 first recording line

710 second recording line

711 step (original record flow chart)

712 step (reproduction flow chart)

713 step (stopping routine)

714 plain text information output section

715 plain text data checking section

716 plain text data coincidence detecting section

717 program executing stopping section

718 sub-cipher decoder

719 RAM section

720 sub-cipher decode data

721 data output section for conversion into plain text

722 program/reproduction operation stopping section

723 recording signal output section

724 CPU

739 pit number

740 first low-reflection section

741 high-reflection section

742 optical recording signal area

743 first physical feature information detecting means

744 second recording means

745 reproduction means

746 first offset voltage

747 inphase/negative-phase signal detecting section

748 inphase/negative-phase signal position detecting section

749 frame synchronizing signal detecting section

750 ID number output section

751 second low-reflection section

752 TOC area

753 second low-reflection section interval

DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF PREFERRED EMBODIMENTS

A description will be made hereinbelow in terms of the embodiments ofthis invention. This invention involves various embodiments relating toan information recording system, information reproducing system,manufacturing method of an optical recording medium and opticalrecording medium which can realize a method and system for theprevention of illegal copy of an optical recording medium and illegalinstall of information on an optical recording medium. An originalrecord fabricating apparatus, so-called mastering apparatus, forfabricating optical disks is included in the information recordingsystem, and a reproducing apparatus such as a CD drive general usersemploy is included in the information reproducing system. In addition, asystem such as a photo-magnetic recording type mini-disk (MD)reproducible and recordable at the user side is described as a recordingand reproducing system, while the "recording" is different from the"recording" at fabrication of the original record.

The following table shows the contents of the embodiments and thecorresponding figures.

First Embodiment

Contents: A method of preventing a software from being illegallyinstalled with a pirate edition preventing system according to thisinvention incorporated.

Figure: FIG. 59

Second Embodiment

Contents: A basic concept of a pirate edition preventing systemaccording to this invention which uses, as first physical featureinformation, arrangement angle information of coordinate arrangements ofpits for a specific signal on a recording medium.

Figure: FIGS. 1, 5

Third Embodiment

Contents: A method for employing, as first physical feature information,the information on a tracking quantity and pit depth on a recordingmedium.

Figure: FIGS. 13, 16, 20

Fourth Embodiment

Contents: A recording method by a second low-reflection section.

1. A method wherein a second low-reflection section is used as firstphysical feature information in the second embodiment.

2. A method of recording a first cipher with a plurality of secondlow-reflection sections being set on the basis of a modulated signal onan optical recording medium.

Figure: FIGS. 38 to 40

Fifth Embodiment

Contents: 1. A method wherein an error signal is used as the firstphysical feature information in the second embodiment.

2. A method wherein a special (EFM) code is used as the first physicalfeature information in the second embodiment.

Figure: FIGS. 54 to 56

Sixth Embodiment

Contents: A method of limiting the install with encryption is made by acombination of the first physical feature information and a sub-ciphernumber.

Figure: FIG. 58

Seventh Embodiment

Contents: Another data recording system and producing method for asecond low-reflection section, which is different from the fourthembodiment.

Figure: FIG. 60

Eighth Embodiment

Contents: A method wherein an arrangement state of inphase pits isemployed as the first physical feature in the second embodiment(three-point coincidence system).

Figure: FIGS. 60 to 63, 92, 94

Ninth Embodiment

Contents: A method of detecting dust which exists in a first cipherrecording area, and a method of displaying the position of the dust.

Figure: FIG. 64

Tenth Embodiment

Contents: A method wherein an offset voltage signal is employed as thefirst physical feature information in the second embodiment.

Figure: FIG. 31

Eleventh Embodiment

Contents: A method of stopping the operation of an illegal copy program.

Figure: FIGS. 69, 770 to 74

Twelfth Embodiment

Contents: A method of preventing a scramble from being released atillegal use with the first physical feature information and a scramblekey being encrypted by a one direction function.

Figure: FIGS. 77 to 79

Thirteenth Embodiment

Contents: 1. A method of providing a plurality of cipher decoders on aROM.

2. A method of using an elliptic function as the one direction functionin the second embodiment.

Figure: FIGS. 83, 86

Fourteenth Embodiment

Contents: A method of fabricating an original record wherein recordingis made from the outer circumferential portion to the innercircumferential portion, the first physical feature information ismeasured and the first cipher is recorded at the inner circumferentialportion.

Figure: FIGS. 88, 89

First Embodiment!

The first embodiment relates to a system and method for the preventionof illegal duplication from a CD or CD-ROM or illegal copy of a programon a CD-ROM to more than the legal number of personal computers. First,a detailed description will be made in terms of a method of releasing akey (unlocking) to execute a specific program recorded on an opticaldisk such as a CD-ROM which contains a number of programs keys such aspasswords. Since a CD as shown in FIG. 59 employs a disk copy preventing(protection) method according to this invention which will be describedhereinafter with reference to FIGS. 70 to 72, difficulty is encounteredto duplicate the CD. In addition, on an optical mark section 387 thereis recorded an ID Number which is different at every disk. This IDnumber is read through an optical sensor 386 comprising a light-emittingsection 389a and a light-receiving section 389b to obtain, for example,data "204312001" which in turn, is inputted into a disk ID number (OPT)item of a key managing table 404 in a memory of a reading CPU. Althoughthis method is usually effective, there is a possibility that anillegally duplicating traders concerned make the duplication by means ofa printing machine. Moreover, in order to improve the duplicationpreventing effect, an extremely high Hc section 401 such as a 40000ematerial made of barium ferrite is provided so as to magnetically recordthe magnetic ID Number (Mag) data "205162" in the factory. This data isreproducible with a common magnetic head, and the reproduced data is putin the disk ID number (Mag) item of the key managing table 404.

As shown in FIG. 8A which is an illustration of a process to record anID number, the employment of a magnetizing device 540 as shown in FIGS.9A to 9D permits the time required for the process to record the IDnumber on a recording medium 2 to become below 1 second. Thismagnetizing device 540 has a ring-like configuration as shown in FIG. 9Aand has a plurality of magnetizing poles 542a to 542f as illustrated inFIGS. 9C and 9D which are enlarged views, coils 545a to 545f being woundaround the magnetizing poles 542a to 542f, respectively. This pluralityof magnetizing poles 542a to 542f are some of the whole magnetizingpoles, and all the magnetizing poles are approximately 100 in number,for example. The current from a magnetizing current generator 543 flowsthrough a current direction switching device 544 so that currentsflowing in preset directions advance into the coils 545a to 545f, thusallowing the magnetization to be accomplished in a desired direction atevery pole. FIG. 9D shows an example that the magnetizing directions areset to establish S, N, S, S, N, S poles from the left side. In thiscase, on a magnetic recording layer 3 there are in an instant formedmagnetically recorded signals in the directions indicated by arrows 51a,51b, 51c and 51d. It is possible to record the signals even on a high Hcmagnetic material such as a 40000e material. Accordingly, the timeneeded fro the process shown in FIG. 8A is substantially equal to thatfor a conventional process shown in FIG. 8B, with no lengthened time forthe production of a CD.

In a method wherein an ID number is magnetically recorded through amagnetic head while the recording medium 2 rotates, the time requiredfor the start-up of rotation of the medium 2, several turns of themedium and the stopping of the rotation is several seconds. For thisreason, there is a problem in that difficulty is experienced tointroduce it to a CD mass production process, in which the processingtime for giving the ID number is approximately 1 second, withoutchanging the flow of the process.

In FIG. 8A which is the illustration of the process for giving an IDnumber, the employment of the magnetizing device 540 illustrated inFIGS. 9A to 9D allows the process time for recording the ID number onthe medium 2 to be less than 1 second, with the result that this is moresuitable for a process which has a fast through put. The recordingoperation of the magnetizing device 540 is as follows. That is, asdescribed above the current direction switching device 544 permitscurrents to flow into the coils 545a to 545f in desired directions,which achieves arbitrary magnetizing directions. Since the FIGS. 9A to9D magnetizing device 540 allows the flows of the currents to therespective coils 545a to 545f in set directions, it is possible toobtain a set magnetizing direction to make a different pattern at everydisk. In FIG. 9D, the magnetizing directions are set to make a patternof S, N, S, S, N, S poles from the left side, in which case the magneticrecording layer 3 instantaneously has the magnetically recorded signalson its specific track in the arrow 51a, 51b, 51c, 51d directions forseveral milliseconds. Accepting a large current, magnetizing devicesmake it possible to accomplish the recording even on a high Hc magneticmaterial such as 40000e. Accordingly, as illustrated in FIG. 8A, theoperating time for the recording the ID number is approximately the sameas that in the prior FIG. 8B process and, hence, the CD production ispossible without changing the flow of the process at all. In addition,in the case of the use of the magnetizing device 540, since the IDnumber can magnetically be recorded with no relation of the medium 2, itis possible to reduce the through put in the process, as well as toaccomplish the accurate printing in the printing process after therecording of the ID number of the FIG. 8A because of no rotation of themedium 2. At present, a magnetic head is commercially available whichpermits the recording on a magnetic recording layer whose Hc is about27000e. Thus, when Hc is low, there arises a problem in that therevision of the ID number is possible. On the other hand, themagnetizing device 540 generally generates a strong magnetic field,which allows the magnetic recording layer 3 having as high Hc as 40000eto permit the recording of the ID number, thereby eliminating such aproblem. In the case where the ID number is recorded in a specific trackof the high Hc magnetic recording layer 3, since the ID number of thismedium is not rewritable, i.e., can not be revised, through a usuallyavailable magnetic head 8, it is possible to ensure a higher degree ofsecurity for the password related to the ID number of the medium.

Furthermore, according to this invention, as illustrated in FIG. 10, amixer 547 mixes a signal from a unique ID number generator 546 with thedata on a physical configuration table (the first physical featureinformation) 532 of a disk so as to make difficult the separationtherebetween if there is no key, the mixture signal, together with aseparation key, being fed to an encrypting device 537 and the resultingcipher 538 being recorded on a magnetic recording track 67 in a magneticrecording area of a disk after the formation process for the disk orrecorded on an optical recording track 65 in the original recordformation process. The magnetic recording track 67 and optical recordingtrack 65 are provided in an area different from the main informationrecording area. For instance, they are placed at an innercircumferential section or outer circumferential section of the disk,and for the magnetic track 67, they may be located on the surfaceopposite to the optical recording layer surface. The aforesaid physicalconfiguration table 532 will sometimes be described as a physicalarrangement table. In the recording and reproducing system 1 side, acipher decoder 543 decrypts the cipher and a separation device 549separates the ID number 550 from the disk physical arrangement table 532by means of the separation key to check the illegal disk according tothe illegal disk check method according to this invention, which will bedescribed later with reference to FIGS. 70 to 71, thereby stopping theoperation of the illegal disk.

In the case of the FIG. 10 method, the cipher (first cipher) 538 to berecorded on the magnetic recording track 67 is based on the mixturesignal of the ID number created by the unique ID number generator 546and the disk physical arrangement table, thus being different at everydisk. As a matter of course, this disk employs the illegal duplicationpreventing method according to this invention which will be describedlater with reference to FIGS. 5 and 7, whereby the illegal duplicationtraders concerned can not illegally duplicate the optical recordingsection of a CD. Accordingly, even if taking one sheet of normal disk totry to illegally use the legal disk a person can not illegally use itexcept for the revision of its ID number. If there is a disk fabricatedon the basis of an original record corresponding to a disk whosepassword is known, the fabrication of the same disk is possible with thesame first cipher being recorded in the magnetic recording section. Thismeans that the employment of the password causes the illegal use. If thefirst cipher of the disk physical arrangement table and the ID cipher ofthe ID number are recorded separately, the same first cipher of thephysical arrangement table is recorded on the magnetic recording layersof all the disks due to the same original record, whereby people canreadily find that it is a disk due to the same original record. For thisreason, when the ID cipher of the ID number is rewritten with the IDcipher of the ID number whose password is known, there is a possibilitythat the illegal use easily take place. However, According to the FIG.10 method, a plurality of different original records are present withrespect to one title, and further, even if the disks are fabricatedthrough the same original record, the first cipher is entirely differentat every disk, which makes it difficult to recognize from the firstcipher that two disks are due to the same original record.

First, a description will be made in terms of the principle of making itdifficult to find, on the basis of the first cipher, a disk fabricatedby the same original record. Although many pieces of first physicalfeature information of the original record are detectable, the recordingcapacity of the disk 2 shows limitation. Moreover, even if firstphysical feature information requiring a large capacity are recorded,the decryption may take much time. The time allowed for the decryptionis approximately 1 second, thus limiting the data quantity of the firstcipher. For this reason, actually the first physical feature informationof the disk results in being obtained by the selection of a portion fromthe first physical feature information obtained. That is, the firstphysical feature information is obtainable by the selection of one froma number of selective values. In this illustration, the selective valueis changed at every disk by a physical information selecting means 532ashown in FIG. 10. Therefore, even if the disks are due to the sameoriginal record, each of the disks has a different first physicalfeature information so that the first ciphers are different from eachother.

As described above, some original records are usually fabricated interms of one software, and each of the disks has a different firstpsychical feature information. From the above, the probability that thedisks has the same first cipher becomes extremely low, thereby making itimpossible to find a disk due to the same original record even if thefirst cipher data is available. Finding it requires the measurement ofthe physical feature information of the disk. Thus, it is difficult fora general user to find a disk due to the same original record.

Furthermore, according to this invention, as described with reference toFIG. 10, the first physical feature information and different ID numbergiven at every disk are enciphered together. Accordingly, even if a diskwhose decryption password is known is obtained to replace the firstcipher of this disk with the first cipher of another disk, its operationstops by means of the pirate edition preventing program except that thefirst physical feature information, i.e., the original record, is notthe same. Therefore, it does not operate at all. In the FIG. 10 method,since difficulty is encountered to find a disk fabricated by the sameoriginal record, the general users can not almost do the revision of theID, thus preventing the general users from doing the illegal use. Thereis no way except that the information on the disk physical arrangementtable 532 are read out from the whole area of the disk so as to check asto whether or not the same original record is used. For checking all thedata on the address, angular arrangement, tracking, pit depth and errorrate, the time is also required for confirmation. Accordingly, it isdifficult for the illegal duplication traders concerned to find a diskfabricated by an original record which produced a disk such as a CDwhose password is known, which makes it difficult that the illegalduplication traders concerned revises the ID number.

A concrete procedure will then be described with reference to a flowchart of FIG. 80. FIG. 69 is a block diagram of the whole including aCPU 665 and a magnetic recording and reproducing means, the operationsof the parts of which will be described hereinafter. In FIG. 80, in astep 405, in response to the input of a start-up command for the programNo. N to the CPU 665, the CPU 665 executes a step 405a to read as towhether or not the key information for the program is recorded on amagnetic track. At this time, a recording current is made to flowthrough the magnetic head 8 so as to erase that data. In the case of thelegal disk 2, the key information is not erasable for that Hc is high.On the other hand, if it is an illegal disk, the key informationdisappears. Then, a step 405b is executed in order to check whether ornot the key data, i.e., a password, exists. If the answer is "NO", theuser receives a key input command on a screen as shown in FIG. 81, thenfollowed by a step 405d where the user inputs, for example, "123456"which in turn, is checked as to whether it is in the right or not in astep 405e. If the answer is "NO", in a step 405f the operation stops anda display is made on a display section 16 to indicate that the key isnot in the right or it is a duplicated disk. On the other hand, if theanswer is "YES", the operational flow goes to a step 405g in which thekey data for allowing the execution of the program No. N is recorded ona magnetic track on the recording medium 2, subsequently followed by astep 405i. In this invention, an ID mark such as a bar code is providedon a surface opposite to the optical reading surface of an optical diskas shown in FIG. 59, or a bar code 619 is provided on the opticalreading surface as shown in FIG. 49.

Returning back to the step 405b, if the answer is "YES", the operationalflow advances to a step 405h to read the key data for the program No. N,and then proceeds to the step 405i to read the disk ID (OPT) on theoptical recording layer, and further goes to a step 504j to read thedisk ID (mag) on the magnetic recording layer, and still further entersinto a step 405 to check whether they are in the right or not. If thedecision shows "NO", a step 405m is executed to display "duplicateddisk", then terminating the operation. On the other hand, if thedecision indicates "YES", a step 405n is executed in order to make thedecryption calculation for the key data, disk ID (OPT) and disk ID(Mag), then followed by a step 405p to check whether the data are in theright or not. If the answer is "NO", an error display is made in a step405q. If the answer is "YES", the use of the program No. N starts in astep 405s.

In the case of using this method according to this invention, if for CDs120 tunes each being voice-compressed to 1/5 are recorded and for gamesofts several hundreds of titles are recorded so that 12 tunes or onegame can initially be listened, they can be released at the costcorresponding to the copyright fee for 12 tunes or one game. Further,when the user paid the fee afterwards, the soft trader informs him ofthe key for the ID No. of the disk, which allows the use of additionalsofts such as tunes and games as shown in FIG. 59. In this case, theemployment of a sound expansion block 407 permits music soft containinga maximum of 120 tunes to be recorded on one CD, for that the soundexpansion expands the recording quantity to five times, i.e., 370minutes. Thus, the user can listen to a favorite tune from the recordedtunes when unlocked. Once the key is unlocked, the key data is recordedso that there is no need to always use the key. This method isapplicable to electronic dictionaries general programs other than themusic CDs and game CDs, providing the same effects. For reducing thecost, it is also possible to omit the ID No. for the high Hc section401.

Second Embodiment!

Secondly, a description will be made in terms of a second embodimentwhich relates to a method of preventing the duplication of a CD itself,i.e., preventing the production of the so-called pirate CD by theillegal copy of the legal CD. In this embodiment, the two-dimensionalarrangement of pits of a disk is treated as the first physical featureinformation. Nowadays, CDs are illegally duplicated in various mannersto produce pirate CDs which in turn, are put in the market, and a way ofpreventing the duplication is needed. Difficulty is experienced toprevent the duplication only with softwares such as encryption. Thesecond embodiment prevents the duplication utilizing a cipher and a pitarrangement of a CD.

FIG. 1 is a block diagram showing a mastering apparatus for fabricatingan original record for CLV type optical disks. The mastering apparatus529 comprises a linear velocity control section 26a whereby an opticalhead 6 generates an optical beam to exposure-record latent images ofpits on a photosensitive surface of a disk 2 while the linear velocityis kept within the range of 1.2 m/s to 1.4 m/s for CDs. For CDs, atracking circuit 24 increases the radius r in pitch of about 1.6 μm perrevolution so that the pits are recorded spirally. Thus, the data arerecorded spirally on an original record as shown in FIG. 3A. In the caseof a CAV optical disk such as a video disk, an original disk isreproduced and an original record is fabricated through rotationalcontrol completely connected with the rotation of the original disk.Accordingly, if the third party gets master data 528, the masteringapparatus 529 can easily fabricate an original record for an opticaldisk having the completely same pattern as a legally manufactured CAVoptical disk. For CAV, the difference in pit pattern between the legallymanufactured original record and the illegally fabricated originalrecord becomes below several μm. For this reason, the conventionalmethod can not distinguish between the legally fabricated optical diskand the illegally produced optical disk on the basis of the physicalarrangement of a pit pattern.

On the other hand, for CLV optical disks such as CD-ROMs, the pits arespirally recorded on an original record at an initially set constantlinear velocity ranging from 1.2 to 1.4 m/s. In the case of CAV, theamount of data to be recorded per revolution is always constant, whilein the case of CLV the data amount per revolution varies as the linearvelocity varies. When the linear velocity is low, the data arrangement530a as shown in FIG. 3A takes place, and when the linear velocity ishigh, the data arrangement 530b as shown in FIG. 3B occurs. Thus,according to the normal mastering apparatus, there comes out thedifference in data arrangement between the legal CD and illegal copiedCD. In the mastering apparatus for the common CDs commerciallyavailable, the linear velocity can be set with accuracy as high as 0.001m/s, and the original record is made with a constant linear velocity.However, even if the original record for 74-minute CDs is fabricatedwith such a high accuracy at the linear velocity of 1.2 m/s, when theerror is shifted to the plus side at the outermost circumferentialtrack, an error corresponding to 11.783 revolutions takes place. Thatis, as compared with the ideal original record, the original record tobe fabricated has the data arrangement 530b whose angular error is11.783 revolutions×360 degrees at the outermost circumferential track.Accordingly, as shown in FIGS. 3A and 3B, the legal CD and illegal CDhave different data arrangements 530, i.e., different A1 to A26addresses 323a to 323x. For instance, when the CD is divided into foursections to define Z1 to Z4 arrangement zones 531, the arrangement zones531 of the A1 to A26 addresses 323 are different from each other.Accordingly, when a corresponding table between the arrangement zones531 and the addresses 323 for two CDs are drawn out, as shown in FIGS.3A and 3B it is found that the physical position tables 532a and 532b ofthe legal CD and illegally duplicated CD are different from each other.This difference allows distinguishing between the illegally duplicatedCD and the legal CD. However, even if a CD is fabricated which is hardto duplicate, the effect comes down if the method of checking the legalCD is in easy revision. According to this invention, as shown in FIG. 5,the physical position table 532 is made during the fabrication of the CDoriginal record or after the completion of production of the originalrecord. This physical arrangement table 532 is encrypted by anencryption means 537 on the basis of a one direction function such as anRSA type disclosure cipher key and then recorded in an optical ROMsection 65 of the CD medium 2 or in the magnetic recording track 67 ofthe CD medium 2a.

Subsequently, in the drive side, a cipher signal 538b is reproduced fromthe CD medium 2 or 2a and the physical arrangement table 532 is restoredusing a decryption program 534 reproduced from the optical recordingsection of the CD. Further, disk rotational (turning) angle information335 corresponding to the actual CD address 38a is obtained on the basisof an index or a rotational pulse signal from the aforesaid FG by usinga disk check program 533a similarly reproduced from the CD and checkedwith the data of the physical arrangement table 532. If OK, theoperation starts. If NO, a decision is made such that it is an illegallyduplicated CD, thus stopping the operation of soft programs or thereproduction of the music softs. In the illegally copied CD shown inFIG. 33B, the physical position table 532b is different from that of thelegal CD, whereby the CD is rejected. The illegally duplicated CD doesnot come into operation except for the decryption of a cipher decryptingprogram 537. Accordingly, even though the cipher signal is copied, therejection takes place. Thus, it is possible to almost completely preventthe reproduction of the illegally copied CD.

There may be three ways the illegal duplication traders concerned cantake as countermeasures: 1) fabricating a CLV disk original recordhaving the totally same pit pattern; 2) decrypting the cipher encodeprogram of the secrete key shown in FIG. 5 by means of the cipher decodeprogram 534; 3) analyzing all the programs in the CD-ROM to replace thecipher decode program 534 and disk check program 533a by the programrevision. Of these three ways, the third way is meaningless because theprogram decryption and program revision need much time, i.e., largecost. In addition, according to this invention, the cipher decodeprogram 534 and disk check program 533a are placed in the media side butnot in the drive side, and hence they can changed at every title orpress of the CD-ROM. Accordingly, since the investment for the programdecryption and cipher decryption is needed at every title, the illegaltraders are unprofitable so that the duplication can be prevented fromthe economical aspect. Further, a description is made in terms of thesecond way. This invention employs a one direction function such as theRSA type disclosure cipher key shown in FIG. 5. For example, theemployment of the equation C=E(M)=Memodn is possible. Thus, even if thecipher decode program, i.e., one key, is in disclosure on the CD-ROM,the decryption of the cipher encode program 537 which is the other keytakes incredible time and hence is substantially impossible. Althoughthere is a possibility that the information on the cipher encode program537 leaks, in the FIG. 5 method the cipher decode program 534 is presentat the media side but not at the drive side. Accordingly, even in casethat it leaks, by changing both the pair of cipher programs, theduplication preventing effect is easily restorable. Finally, the firstway of fabricating the CLV original record having the completely samepattern is difficult because, although one-pulse rotational signalemerges per revolution, the current CLV mastering apparatus 529 does notinclude a means to detect the rotational angle with high accuracy forcontrol. In this case, with the rotational angle information andrecorded signal being read out from the duplication source, i.e., CD, totake the synchronization with the rotational pulses during theduplication, a similar pit patter can be drawn with some degree ofpositional accuracy, but not exactly. However, this is possible only inthe case where the recording on the duplication source CD is effected atthe same linear velocity.

In the mastering apparatus 529 according to this invention, as shown inFIG. 1 a CLV modulation signal generating section 10a generates a CLVmodulation signal which in turn, is supplied to a linear velocitymodulating section 26a in some case and a time-axis modulating section37a of an optical recording circuit 37 in some case for CLV modulation.The linear velocity modulating section 26a modulates, at random, thelinear velocity at 1.2 m/s to 1.4 m/s which are within the CD standardrange as shown in FIG. 2A. This can similarly be realized even if thetime-axis modulating section 37a modulates the signal while the linearvelocity is constant, in which case there is no need for themodification of the apparatus. Difficulty is encountered to detect withhigh accuracy the linear velocity modulation from the duplication sourceCD. Even the mastering apparatus which made the original record can notduplicate it, for that the recording is performed at random withoutcontrolled. The original record always varies. For this reason, it isalmost impossible to completely duplicate the CD involving the linearvelocity modulation according to this invention. However, since thelinear velocity from 1.2 to 1.4 m/s for CDs is in the standard range,the data is reproducible by means of the common CD-ROM player currentlyput on the market.

Let it be assumed that ass shown in FIG. 2B, the same data is recordedon a specific optical track 65a at a constant linear velocity of 1.2 m/sand, when the start point is taken as S, the end point A1 of therecorded data takes a position of 360 degrees. In this case, if as shownin FIG. 2C the linear velocity evenly increases from 1.2 m/s to 1.4 m/sduring one revolution, the physical position 539a of the address A3comes to the physical position 539a shifted by 30 degrees. Further, thelinear velocity increases during 1/2 revolution, it comes to thephysical position 539c shifted by 45 degrees. This means that theposition is changeable by a maximum of 45 degrees during one revolution.Since the common CLV mastering apparatus can generate only onerotational pulse per revolution, the positional error is accumulated upto 90 degrees during two revolutions. Even if in the future the illegalduplication traders carries out the rotation control, the positionaldeviation of 90 degrees occurs between the legal original record andillegally copied original record by means of the linear velocitymodulation according to this invention. Detecting this positionaldeviation allows the illegally copied CD. The position deviationdetecting resolution is set to be below 90 degrees. Accordingly, in thecase where the linear velocity is changed in the range from 1.2 to 1.4m/s, when as illustrated in FIGS. 3A and 3B four 90-degree divisionzones Z1, Z2, Z3 and Z4 are set, the detection of the illegal CD ispossible. If dividing more than four, its effect improves. Naturally, ifa CLV mastering apparatus having an extremely high accuracy would newlybe developed, the illegal traders can make the wholly same pit pattern.However, only several companies in the world can develop such anapparatus and, therefore, it is not required for the ordinary usepurposes. If the shipment of such a mastering apparatus is limited forthe purposes of protecting the copyright owner, the complete preventionof the illegal copy is possible.

Furthermore, In the mastering apparatus equipped with a rotational anglesensor 17a as shown in FIG. 1, the physical position table 532 is madeout on the basis of the address information 32a of the input data andpositional information 32b on the rotational angle from a motor 17, andthen encrypted through the cipher encoder 537 and further recorded atthe outermost circumferential portion of the original record 2M by meansof the optical recording circuit 37. Thus, the physical arrangementtable 532 encrypted is recorded on an optical track 65 of the FIG. 5disk 2 during the formation of the original record. Accordingly, thisdisk is reproducible even by an ordinary CD-ROM drive not having amagnetic head. In this case, as illustrated in FIGS. 5 and 6, the driveis required to include a disk rotational angle sensor 335. Thisdetecting means is useful if only detecting the relative position of theaddress 323 and 90-degree zone, and hence a complicated sensor such as aangular sensor is not always needed. The relative position detectingmethod will be described with reference to FIG. 4. For example, as shownin (a) of FIG. 4 the rotational pulse from the motor or the index signalfrom the optical sensor once generates per revolution of the disk. Thisinterval is time-divided as shown in (b) of FIG. 4 so that, in the caseof six-divided zones, the signal position time slots Z1 to Z6 are given.On the other hand, as described before the address signals 323a, 323bare obtainable from the sub-code of the reproduced signal. A signalposition indicating signal is effective to detect that the address A1exists in the zone Z1 and the address A2 is present in the zone Z3. Inthis case, the structure becomes simple when the rotation signal or zonesignal is recorded in the sub-code, while the data can entirely beduplicated, which destroys the duplication preventing effect.Accordingly, the provision of a means to detect the rotational angle ata place other than the optical recording section like this invention canoffer a high duplication preventing effect.

Returning back to FIG. 6, in the recording and reproducing system, thesignal is reproduced by an optical reproducing circuit 38, and if thephysical arrangement table 532 is present in the optical track, in theFIG. 7 flow chart the operational flow advances from a steps 471b to471e. If the answer of the step 471b is "NO", the step 471c is executedin order to check whether the cipher data exists in the magneticrecording section 67. If "NO", the operational flow goes to a step 471rto give a permission for the start-up. On the other hand, if "YES", theoperational flow proceeds to the steps 471d, 471e to reproduce thecipher and to start the decryption program of the cipher decoder 534recorded on the ROM of the drive or on the disk for the decryption, thenfollowed by a step 471f to make out the physical arrangement table 532,i.e., the zone-address table (An:Zn). A step 471w is for checkingwhether or not the disk check program is in the media. If the decisionis "NO", the operational flow advances to a step 471p. If the decisionis "YES", the operational flow proceeds to a step 471g to start the diskcheck program recorded within the disk. In the disk check program (thestep 471f), a step 471h is first executed to set n=0, and then a step471i is implemented to set n=n+1, and further a step 471j is performedto search the address An of the disk 2 in the drive side forreproduction. In a step 471k, the positional information Z'n is detectedand outputted by the foregoing position detecting means 335, and in astep 471m a check is made as to whether Z'n=Zn. If "NO", the operationalflow goes to a step 471u to decide that it is an illegally copied CD andfurther to issue an indication of "illegally copied CD" to the displaysection 16, then followed by a step 471s for stopping. On the otherhand, if the decision of the step 471m is "YES", the operational flowgoes to a step 471n to check whether n=the last. If "NO", theoperational flow returns to the step 471i. If "YES", the operationalflow advances to the step 471p. The step 471p checks whether or not thedisk check program is placed in the drive side ROM or RAM. If thedecision is "NO", the step 471r is executed to start the soft. On theother hand, if "YES", a step 471q is implemented to run the disk checkprogram. The operational content is the same as a step 471t. Thus, ifthe answer is "NO", the operational flow advances to the steps 471u and471s. If the answer is "YES", the step 471r is implemented to start toreproduce the soft within the disk.

In the case where the CD player which is currently in productionreproduces a disk whose linear velocity varies between 1.2 to 1.4 m/s,there is not problem in reproducing the original signal. On the otherhand, the mastering apparatus can do the cutting with a considerablelinear velocity accuracy above 0.001 m/s. Thus, as the standard for themastering apparatus there has been provided the CD standard in which thelinear velocity=±0.01 m/s. If conforming with the this CD standard, asshown in FIGS. 11A and 11B the linear velocity can increase, forexample, from 1.20 m/s to 1.22 m/s within the standard. In this case, asshown in FIGS. 11C and 11D the angular physical arrangement of the sameaddress is shifted by an angle of 5.9 degrees per revolution of the diskfrom 539a to 539b. When as shown in FIG. 13 a rotational angle sensor335 which detects the angle shift of 5.9 degrees is provided in therecording and reproducing system side, the physical arrangementdifference is distinguishable. For CDs, the rotational angle sensor 335is useful which has a resolution of 6 degrees, i.e., which angle-dividesone revolution into more than 60.

The arrangement of this rotational angle sensor 335 is illustrated inthe FIG. 16 block diagram of the recording and reproducing system. Sincea pulse emerging from a rotational angle sensor 17a such as a FG of themotor 17 is time-divided by a time-division circuit 553a of an angularposition detecting section 553 of a disk physical arrangement detectingsection 556, even if only one rotational pulse signal is obtainable perrevolution, when for example the time accuracy is ±5%, it can be dividedinto 20, which ensures the angular resolution about 18 degrees. Thisoperation was described above with reference to FIGS. 4A, 4B and 4C.Since for CDs an eccentricity of ±200 μm takes place, an anglemeasurement error appears due to the eccentricity. In the case of a CDaccording to the CD standard, the angle measurement error of a maximumof 0.8 degrees occurs at P--P due to the eccentricity. Accordingly, ifthe angle measurement resolution of 1 degree is needed, the measurementbecomes impossible. When a high angular resolution is needed in order toavoid this problem, an eccentric quantity detecting section 553c isprovided in the angular position detecting section 553 in FIG. 16 tomeasure the eccentric amount so that the correction calculation is madein an eccentric quantity correction section 553b to eliminate theinfluence from the eccentricity. A description will be made in terms ofthe detection of the eccentric quantity and the calculation of thecorrection amount. When no eccentricity occurs as shown in FIG. 19A, thecenter of a triangle made by three points A, B, C on one circle iscoincident with the real center 557 of the disk under the condition thatθa=θb=θc. Actually, as shown in FIG. 19B an eccentricity 559 takes placedue to the eccentricity of the disk and the variation in the mounting ofthe disk. As shown in FIG. 19B, the relative angles of the three pointaddresses A, B, C are detected by the angle sensor 353, whereby thedifference L'a between the rotational center 558 of the disk and thereal disk center 557 can be calculated as L'a=f (θa, θb, θc). Theeccentricity correction section 553b corrects, using the calculatedeccentric amount, the rotational angle signal from the rotational anglesensor 17a. This can eliminate the adverse influence from theeccentricity so as to improve the accuracy so that the angularresolution is below 1 degree, thereby improving the detection accuracyof the illegal disk.

In the case where the detection of the angular position is made with theresolution as low as 6 degrees as mentioned before, the decision betweenthe legal and illegal disks is required to be strict. In particular, ifthe decision is made such that the legal disk is the illegal disk, thelegal users suffer large damage. It is absolutely needed to avoid it.For this reason, as illustrated in steps 551t, 551u, 551v of the FIG. 14flow chart, the access to the address of the disk which has been decidedas an illegal disk is made two or more times for reproduction and check,whereby it is possible to avoid the wrong decision. The basic portion ofthe FIG. 14 flow chart is the same as the FIG. 7 flow chart, and onlyadditional portions are described and the description of the portionsother than the additional portions is omitted for simplicity.

When in a step 551 a decision is made such that the value is out of theallowable range, in the step 551t the access to the address An is againmade plural times, then followed by the step 551u to detect the zonenumber Z'n indicative of the relative angle with respect to the addressAn, and further followed by the step 551v to check plural times whetheror not the value is within the allowable range. If the decision is"YES", the disk is considered as a legal disk, and the operational flowgoes to a step 551s. On the other hand, if the decision is "NO", it isconsidered as an illegal disk, and the operational flow advances to thesteps 471u and 471s to inhibit the operation of the program.

In addition, if a statistic process is added for the prevention of thewrong decision, the decision accuracy improves. In FIG. 12A, in thelegal original record the frequency distributions of angle-address,angle-tracking direction, address-tracking direction, angle-pit depthand address-pit depth read out become as illustrated in a graph (1).Accordingly, in the case where specific data are selected and reproducedby a player as shown in a graph (2), easily discriminable sample addressdata are selected. As shown in FIG. 12B the formed disk is reproduced tofind signal sections, indicated with black color, which are out of theallowable range, and further to strike the abnormal values, which areout of the allowable range, off a list as shown by a graph (4). Althoughin the illustration the frequency distribution of angle-addressarrangement is indicated, the same effect is also obtainable in terms ofthe frequency distribution of pit depth or address-tracking quantity.This permits the copy prevention signal section hard to discriminate,i.e., easy to made a mistake to be eliminated from the list, whichreduces the mistake during the reproduction by the reproducing player.That is, the mistake probability decreases with the access to theaddress of the disk decided as illegality being made two or more times.

On the other hand, in FIG. 12C, in the original record illegallyduplicated, since the address of the formed disk is read out tofabricate the original record, a copy protect signal (CP) signalgenerates which distributes in a given range at a constant probabilityas shown in a graph (5). In this case, since the disk physicalarrangement table can not be revised as described before, the dataselection as seen in the graph (2) is impossible. Accordingly, in thephysical arrangement of the illegal original record the data areconsiderably close to the limits of the allowable range or the CP signalexists out of the allowable range. As shown in FIG. 12D, in the opticaldisk formed from the illegal original record there occur errors due tothe formation variation which cause a distribution as shown in a graph(6). In the graph (6), the physical arrangement signal 552b exceedingthe allowable value develops as indicated by black color. Since thephysical arrangement signal 552b inherent in the illegal disk isdetectable through the disk check program, the operation of the programstops, thereby preventing the use of the copied disk. The distributionof the angle-address CP signal disperses within a narrow range. On theother hand, in the case of the pit depth shown in FIG. 17B, the depthgreatly varies in accordance with the cutting and formation condition,and it is considerably difficult to control this with precision.Therefore, the yield of the illegally duplicated disk at manufacturingsharply drops. For this reason, in the case of the pit depth, strongcopy protection is possible.

A description will be made hereinbelow in terms of a reproducing systemwhich detects the frequency distribution of the disk physicalarrangement as shown in FIGS. 12A to 12D for the prevention of copy. Asillustrated in FIGS. 13 and 16, the recording and reproducing system 1is equipped with a disk physical arrangement detecting section 556including three detection sections: an angular position detectingsection 553, a track displacement detecting section 554 and a pit depthdetecting section 555 which output a detection signal indicative of theangular position information Z'n, a detection signal representative ofthe tracking displacement T'n, and a detection signal indicative of pitdepth D'n, respectively. When they are coincident in time with thesignal A'n from an address detecting section 557, it is possible toobtain the corresponding data representative of A'n-Z'n, A'n-T'n,A'n-D'n, Z'n-T'n, Z'n-D'n, T'n-D'n. These data are checked in a checkingsection 535 with An, Zn, Tn, Dn of the reference disk physicalarrangement table 532 decoded by the cipher decoder 534. If the decisionis made such that it is not a legal disk, an output/operation stoppingmeans 536 stops the operation of the program.

Further, a description will be made with a flow chart in terms of astatistic way to reduce the misjudgment for disks. In the flow chart ofFIG. 14 the description of portions which are the same as that of FIG. 7will be omitted for brevity. Further, the description will be limited tothe decision of the illegal disk based on the frequency distributions ofthe disk physical arrangement data of the graphs (1) to (6) in FIGS. 12Ato 12D. First, in the disk check program 471t, a step 551W is executedso as to check every time whether the CP (Copy Protect) decryptionprogram, i.e., a first cipher decoder 534a having a one directionfunction (for example, RSA) calculating section 534c to decrypt thereference physical arrangement table 532 of the cipher decoder 534 inFIG. 16, is illegally changed or not, in order words, to check illegalrevision and illegal decryption by an illegal cipher decoder, with checkpoints being provided at given portions of the disk check program orapplication program. If "YES", the operation stops, thereby making itpossible to prevent the illegal traders from replacing the first cipherdecoder 534a with an illegal cipher decoder. This provides a higherdegree of cipher security to further ensure the duplication prevention.Subsequently, a step 551f follows, for the angular position, to measurethe position of a specific address and to measure the distribution stateof the deviation amount with respect to the reference angle of thereference physical arrangement table 532 of the zone number. Assumingthat m=0 indicates that the deviation does not occur and m=+n indicatesthat the zone is shifted by n, a step 551g is executed to set m=-1, astep 551h is executed to set m=m+1, and a step 551i is performed tocheck whether or not the angular zone Z'n is shifted by m. If the answeris "NO", the operational flow returns to a step 551h. If "YES", theoperational flow advances to a step 551j to add it to the Z'n deviationdistribution list so that the deviation distribution table is drawn upin succession. If m=the last in a step 551k, the next step 471n isperformed. If "NO", the operational flow returns to the step 551h. Insuch a manner, the measurement is made in terms of the angular positionof the specific address in FIG. 16, the state tracking displacement, orthe distribution states of the deviations of the pit depth andangle/address positions with respect to the reference.

A step 551m of the disk check program 471t is a legality decisionprogram wherein in a step 551n the maximum allowable value Pn (m) forthe deviation m of the angular arrangement Z'n of the address n withrespect to the reference, which is encrypted and recorded on a magneticrecording layer or an optical recording layer, is decrypted and read outso as to check the a deviation distribution table 556a shown in FIG. 18and drawn up by the physical position deviation distribution measurementprogram in the foregoing step 551f and the reference physicalarrangement table 532a to check whether the disk is legal or illegal.After setting m=0 in a step 551p and setting m=m+1 in a step 551q, in astep 551r a check is made regarding whether it is within the allowablerange. Checking whether being within the allowable range is achieved bychecking whether or not the number of Z'n is smaller than Pn (m) in FIG.18. If "NO", operational flow advances to the aforesaid step 551f toagain make access to the corresponding address. If "NO", a decision ismade such that the disk is illegal. On the other hand, if OK, theoperational flow goes to a step 551s. If m=the last, the operationalflow goes to a step 471p, while if "NO", the operational flow returns tothe step 551q. Such a measurement of the deviation distribution of Z'nwith respect to Zn permits the statistic process which decides that itis an illegal disk when the value is out of the allowable range, therebyfurther reducing the probability that the legal disk is taken as anillegal disk, or vice versa.

In addition, in the FIG. 14 flow chart, in a step 551a a randomextractor 582 including a random number generator 583 as shown in FIG.16 supplies a partially selective signal to the cipher decoder 534 orthe magnetic reproducing circuit 30 to select a portion of all themagnetic tracks or optical tracks, which contain a cipher, for theaccess and reproduction. Accordingly, since the access is made only to aportion of all the data, for example, about 100 of 10000, the mechanicalaccess time becomes shorter to cause the time necessary for checking theduplication to become shorter. Furthermore, the random extractor 582issues a selective signal the cipher decoder 534 to carry out thedecryption of a portion of the cipher data reproduced. For instance, inthe case of a cipher based on a one direction function of 512 bits, thedecryption takes a 32-bit microcomputer approximately 1/5 second.However, the employment of this partial selective method can reduce thetime for the decryption. Since the random number generator 584 checks aminimum of necessary sampled data which is different every time, even ifusing a system which checks only 100 of 10000 sampling points everytime, the 10000 sampling points are finally checked. Accordingly, theduplication traders are required to duplicate the disk such that thephysical arrangement of all the 10000 sampling points are the same asthe reference disk. It is difficult to duplicate the angles, trackingamounts and pit depths at all the sampling points, which improves theduplication prevention effect. The addition of this random extractor 582is able to considerably reduce the disk check time without deterioratingthe high duplication prevention effect.

Third Embodiment!

A description will be made hereinbelow with reference to FIGS. 13 and 16in terms of a third embodiment which uses the tracking displacement andthe pit depth as the first physical feature information. In FIG. 16, inthe disk physical arrangement detecting section of the recording andreproducing system 1, in addition to the aforementioned angular positiondetecting section 553, there is provided two detecting sections: atracking amount detecting section 554 and a pit depth detecting section555. The tracking amount detecting section 554 receives a trackingamount Tn at the address n from a tracking amount sensor 24a such as atracking error detecting circuit which can measure the wobbling of thetracking control section 24 of the optical head 6, and measures thecoincidence in time between the tracking amount and the other detectionsignals such as A'n, Z'n, D'n to output the result as T'n to thechecking section 535. This principle will be described with reference toFIGS. 20A and 20B. In the legal disk shown in FIG. 20A, the physicalposition 539a of the address A1 is modulated in the tracking directionduring the formation of the original record (for example, wobbling).Thus, the tracking is shifted toward an outer circumferential portion.When this is defined as T1=+1, the physical position 539b of the addressA2 is taken as T2=-1. This information is discriminable during theformation of the original record or after the fabrication thereof, andtherefore, after the reference physical arrangement table 532 is drawnup and encrypted, it is recorded on the medium 2.

Secondly, in the medium 2 illegally duplicated as shown in FIG. 20B,generally the tracking displacement is not given. Even if the trackingdisplacement is given, as shown in the illustration, the trackingdisplacements T'1 and T'2 of the addresses A1 and A2 in the same angularzone Z1 give 01+1, and the disk physical arrangement table 556 measuredis different from the reference physical arrangement table 532 of thelegal disk. Accordingly, the checking section 535 of the disk checksection 533 in FIG. 16 detects this and the output/operation stoppingmeans 536 stops the output of the program, the operation of the program,or the decryption of the application program by the second cipherdecoder 534b and outputs a display signal indicative of "illegallycopied disk" to the display section 16. In the case of FIG. 16, sincethe disk check program itself is encrypted by the second cipher decoder534b, difficulty is encountered to revise the disk check program 533,thus increasing illegal duplication preventing effect.

Furthermore, a description will be made about the pit depth detectingsection. As shown in FIG. 16, the optically reproduced signal from theoptical head 6 is fed to an amplitude detecting section 555a of a pitdepth detecting section 555, which is designed to detect the amplitudeof the envelop or the variation of the modulation factor, so as todetect the pit depth on the basis of the amplitude variation, thedetection output D'n being delivered to the checking section 535 to bechecked with the data of the reference physical arrangement table 532.If different therefrom, the copy preventing operation starts. Thus, asshown in FIGS. 21A to 21D, the four parameters of the address An, angleZn, tracking displacement Tn and pit depth Dn can be checked withrespect to the physical arrangements 539a, 539b, 539c of one samplingpoint. Thus, it is needed to duplicate the original record whichconforms with the four parameters at all the sampling points. It isdifficult to duplicate the original record satisfying such conditions ata high yield, which results in realizing a great copy preventingfunction. In particular, duplicating a pit group whose widths aredifferent and whose depths are the same is extremely difficult anddeteriorates the yield. Accordingly, the duplication is economicallyimpossible. In this invention, as shown in FIG. 36, when in a step 584a1000 sets of pit groups are recorded under 1000 recording conditionsdifferent in recording output, pulse width and so on, in a step 584b thepit groups satisfying 5 sets of conditions are made at a given yield,for example, at 1/200 yield. In a step 564a the physical arrangements ofthe pit groups satisfying the conditions are found by the monitor of theoriginal record by a leaser beam. In a step 584d the physicalarrangement table for the satisfying pit groups is drawn up, and in astep 584e the physical arrangement table is encrypted, and further, if astep 584f shows the optical recording section, in a step 584g theobtained cipher is recorded on a second photosensitive section 572a ofthe original record. In a step 584h a plastic is injected to theoriginal record to produce an optical disk. In a step 584i a reflectionlayer is formed, in a step 584j a magnetic layer is completed, ifalready completed, in a step 584k a magnetic recording section is made,and in a step 584m the cipher is recorded in the magnetic recordingsection to complete an optical disk. The pit depth is measured after thefabrication of the original record, the encryption is made and thearrangement table is recorded, thereby increasing the yield up toapproximately 100% at the time of the production of the original record.

A description will be made in terms of a detecting method of the pitdepth in the pit depth detecting section 555. In FIG. 17A, pits 561a to561f of an illegally duplicated disk have the same pit depth. Of pits ofthe legal disk shown in FIG. 17B, the pits 560c, 560d, 560e areshallower. Accordingly, as shown in FIG. 17C reproduced pulses 562c,562d, 562e have a lower peak value, and the reproduced output becomes asshown in FIG. 17F when a multi-level slicer 555b assumes the referenceslice level S0, while the output disappears as shown in FIG. 17D at thedetection slice level S1. Accordingly, taking the logical product (AND)of the inverse value of S1 and S0, the duplication preventing signals563c, 563d, 563e are obtainable as shown in FIG. 17G only when the diskis a legal disk. In the illegal disk, since the output at the detectionslice level S1 successively becomes 1, the outputs of the duplicationpreventing signals do not appear. For this reason, the detection of theduplicated disk is possible. In addition, in this case, even if theamplitude detecting section 555a detects the amplitude lowering of theenvelope of the optical output waveform or the lowing of the modulationfactor and the inverse sign of S1 is obtained, a similar effect isavailable.

As obvious from a FIG. 23 comparison table on the duplication preventingeffects, since an original record fabricating apparatus for common CDsor MDs does not have an angle control function, the angular directiondisk check, i.e., A, is effective. On the other hand, since an originalrecord fabricating apparatus for laser disks (LDs), MDs and CD-ROMs isnot equipped with a wobbling, i.e., tracking direction, control means,the tracking direction displacement, i.e., B, is effective. In the caseof the depth direction, i.e., C, in addition to the conventionalcircuit, a detection circuit is required which can detects the amplitudeor modulation factor, and hence the detection is impossible with theexisting IC for CDs. Accordingly, since at present A+B provides a greatcopy preventing effect and has compatibility with the existing IC, thegreatest effect is obtainable for CDs and MDs. Consequently, the currentoriginal record fabricating apparatus can offer the greatest effect whenemploying the checking method based on A+B, i.e., the combination of twoparameters: angular direction and tracking direction.

FIG. 24 shows a disk original record fabricating apparatus whichimplements the modulation on the angular direction, tracking directionand pit depth direction. The FIG. 24 mastering apparatus 529 basicallyand substantially has the same arrangement and operation as theaforementioned FIG. 1 mastering apparatus, and the description thereofis limited to the portions differing therefrom. A description is firstmade in terms of the tracking modulation method. In the system controlsection, there is provided a tracking modulation signal generator 564which supplies a modulation signal to a tracking control section 24 toperform the tracking at almost constant radius r0 on the basis of areference track pitch 24a. The modulation such as wobbling is carriedout within the range of the track radius r0±dr. Thus, a meanderringtrack is formed on the original record 572 as shown in FIGS. 20A and20B. This tracking displacement is fed to a tracking displacementinformation section 32g of a positional information input section 32b.In the copy preventing signal generator 565, the reference physicalarrangement table 532 on the address An, angle Zn, tracking displacementTn and pit depth Dn as described with reference to FIG. 13 is drawn upand encrypted in the cipher encoder 537. This cipher is recorded in asecond original record area 572a provided at an outer circumferentialportion of the original record as shown in FIGS. 32 and 33 or recordedin a second original record area provided at an outer circumferentialportion as shown in FIGS. 34 and 35. In addition, the modulation Dn inthe pit depth direction can individually be added. In FIG. 24, thesystem control section 10 is equipped with an optical output modulationsignal generating section 566 whereby the amplitude of the laser outputof an output modulation section 567 in the optical recording section 37bvaries as shown by the waveform (2) of FIG. 32, or a pulse widthmodulating section 568 modulates the pulse duration or pulse separationwith a constant amplitude as shown in by the waveform (1) of FIG. 32,thereby changing the effective value of the laser output. With this, aphotosensitive section 574 having depths can be formed in aphotosensitive section 573 of the original record 572 as shown by theprocess (2) of FIG. 32. Through the etching process, pits 560a to 560ehaving different depths are formed as shown by the process (3) of FIG.32, the deep pits 560a, 560c, 560d having depths close to λ/4 and theshallow pits 560b, 560e having depths close to λ/6. This original record572 is metal-plated with nickel or the like so as to produce a metallicoriginal record as shown by the process (4) of FIG. 32, and thenplastic-formed to fabricate a formed disk 576 as shown by the processes(5) and (6) of FIG. 32. In the case where the pits are formed on theoriginal record by changing the amplitude of the laser output, since thepeak value of the reproduced output decreases as shown by the waveform(5) of FIG. 31, if it is sliced with a specific slice level by a levelslicer, the pulse duration tends to be detected as a smaller duration ascompared with the case that pit depth is large, thus making it difficultto provide a normal digital output. For this reason, a pulse widthadjusting section 569 generates a wider pulse T+ΔT as shown by thewaveform (2) of FIG. 31 relative to the original signal of thesynchronism T as shown by the waveform (1) of FIG. 31 so that thedigital signal is corrected as shown by the waveform (6). In the case ofno correction, a sliced digital output is obtained which has a durationsmaller than that of the original signal as shown by the waveform (7) ofFIG. 31, resulting in the output of an incorrect digital signal.

Thus, the pit depth is modulated through the optical output modulatingsection 567, and the pit depth information Dn is fed from the opticaloutput modulation signal generating section 566 to a pit depthinformation section 32h. In the copy preventing signal generatingsection 565, the reference physical arrangement table 532 on theaforesaid An, Zn, Tn, Dn are drawn up and encrypted by the cipherencoder 537 and recorded on the magnetic recording layer. Or, asillustrated in FIG. 34, after the fabrication of an original recordhaving at its outer circumferential portion a second photosensitivesection 577, the pit depth and so on are measured as shown by theprocess (5) of FIG. 34 to a physical arrangement table which in turn,encrypted, before this cipher is recorded in the second photosensitivesection 577 as shown in the process (6) of FIG. 34 and the physicalarrangement table 532, together with program softs, is recorded on oneoriginal record as shown in the processes (7) to (9). In the case wheredisks do not have different ID numbers, the magnetic layer is not alwaysneeded, and only the optical recording section provides the copypreventing effect in accordance with this method. FIGS. 35A and 35B area top view and cross-sectional view of an original record. It is alsoappropriate to combine two original records as shown in FIGS. 32, 33Aand 33B. Further, in FIG. 24, there is provided a communicationinterface section 578 which allow communication with the external,whereby as shown in FIG. 29, in an external cipher encoder 579 the softcopyright owner has, the physical arrangement table is encrypted bymeans of a first cipher key 32d and fed back from the external cipherencoder 579 through a second communication interface 578a, acommunication line and the communication interface 578 to a masteringapparatus 529 manufactured by an optical disk manufacturing company.According to this method, the first cipher key 32d belonging to thecopyright owner is not given to the optical disk manufacturing company,which increases the degree of cipher security. In addition, in case thatthe first cipher key 32d is stolen, there is no need for the opticaldisk manufacturing company to take the responsibility.

Furthermore, the precise control for the pit machining in the depthdirection is considerably difficult because of depending on varyingfactors such as the sensitivity of the photosensitive material, gammacharacteristic, output variation and beam configuration of the laserlight, thermal characteristic of the glass substrate, etchingcharacteristic, dimensional error of the pressing formation. Forexample, in the case of changing the pulse duration and depths of thepits as shown in FIG. 22, the amplitude of the laser output and the mostsuitable condition for the pulse duration vary at every pulse duration.Accordingly, taking the gamma characteristic into consideration, ncombinational conditions on the laser output value and pulse durationare made as shown in FIG. 22. For example, several hundreds of laseroutput combinations are made to fabricate original records severalhundred times under different conditions. Of these, the original recordshaving the most suitable pit depth can be fabricated several times. Thatis, of the several hundreds of the original records, several originalrecords satisfy the conditions. In these satisfied original recordsthere is formed a pit group whereby, as shown by portions 581a, 581c ofthe waveform (3) in FIG. 22, the reproduced signal reaches the referencevoltage So but not reaching the detection voltage S1. However, thefabrications of several hundreds of useless original records cost alarge amount of money and, therefore, this is economically impossible.Thus, this invention employs a method of forming the most suitable pitsby the fabrication of one original record. As shown in FIG. 30, severalhundred sets, i.e., n sets of 580a to 580d pit groups are respectivelyrecorded under n sets of laser output conditions. The pit groups havingthe pit depth, pit configuration and pulse width satisfying theconditions can be obtained with the probability of some of n sets, forexample, several sets of several hundred sets. As shown in FIG. 15, thephysical arrangement table 532 of the pit group 580c satisfying theconditions is encrypted and recorded on the magnetic recording sectionof the disk 2 or recorded on the second original record or the opticalrecording section of the second photosensitive section original record572, thus making to possible to fabricate the copy preventing disk usingthe pit depth. In this case, as the yield of the satisfied pit groupbecomes worse, the number of the n sets of the pit group increases,while the copy preventing ability accordingly increases. Actually, whenthe total number of the pits of one set of the pit group 560 and thenumber of the kinds of pulse durations increase, the number ofcombinations and the yield comes to approximately one-several hundredth.Since the physical arrangement table 532 is encrypted with a onedirection function as described before, it is impossible to revise itexcept that the cipher key is known. Accordingly, the duplicationtraders can not duplicate the disks except that they produce severalhundreds of expensive original records. That is, the fabrication of oneduplicated original record costs a large amount of money, and thereforeit is difficult economically so that the traders will give up tofabricate the original record. On the other hand, even if severalhundreds of kinds of 10-bit pit groups are provided and several hundredsets of the pit groups are made, the total capacity is about severaltens KB, and for example, the influence on the capacity 640 MB of aCD-ROM is 1/10000, which results in almost no reduction of the capacityaccording to this invention. Although the illustration is made in termsof an example using a ROM disk such as a CD, it is also possible that arecording type optical disk such as a partial ROM is used and thephysical arrangement table is encrypted and recorded on a recordinglayer of an optical RAM. This can offer the same effect. Moreover, asshown in the FIG. 37 flow chart, the disk check program 584 can not berevised or eliminated except that the whole application program isdecrypted with the disposition at 1000 places, for example, like aprogram install routine 584d of a program 586 of an application softprogram, a printing routine 584e and a retention routine 584f, andhence, even if a portion of the disk check program 585 is omitted, theremaining check program stops the operation. Thus, with the disk checkprogram being divided into a plurality of portions and disposed, theillegal duplication becomes difficult.

Fourth Embodiment!

In the fourth embodiment, a second low-reflection (low-reflectance)section is provided as the first physical feature information. Theformation of the second low-reflection section allows the production ofa physical ID mark and the detection thereof. More specifically, an areawith no reflective layer is intentionally provided in a portion of anoptical reflective layer (made of AL or the like) of a ROM optical disksuch as a CD-ROM to create the physical ID. FIGS. 38, 39 and 40 aresystem block diagrams showing the principle of the fourth embodiment.Further, FIG. 41 shows a state of a physical ID inherent in a disk. Asshown in FIG. 15D, 10 low-reflection sections 584, 584a to 584i which donot have a reflective film 48 are disposed radially and 11 referencelow-reflection sections 585 are intentionally provided during theformation of the reflective film. When a light beam from the opticalhead 6 is focused on the low-reflection section 584, the reflected lightquantity is extremely reduced as compared with the reflective section48, Accordingly, as shown by the optically reproduced signal of FIG.41E, the signal level extremely decreases. As shown in the block diagramof FIG. 39, a comparator 587 of a low-reflection light quantitydetecting section 586 detects an optically reproduced analog signalhaving a lower signal level than that of an optical reference value 588to detect the low-reflection light quantity section. A low-reflectionsection detection signal having a waveform as shown by (5) of FIG. 42 isoutputted during the detection. an estimation is made in terms of theaddresses of the start position and end position of this signal and theclock position.

The optically reproduced signal is shaped and converted into a digitalsignal by means of a waveform-shaping circuit 590 including an AGC 590a.A clock reproducing section 38a reproduces a clock signal on the basisof the waveform-shaped signal. An EFM demodulator 592 of a demodulatingsection 591 demodulates the signal and an ECC corrects errors, thenoutputting a digital signal. The EFM-demodulated signal is led to aphysical address outputting section 593. For CDs (Q bits of subcode), anMSF address is outputted from an address outputting section 594 and asynchronizing signal such as a frame synchronizing signal is outputtedfrom a synchronizing signal outputting section 595. The clockreproducing section 38a outputs a demodulated clock.

In a low-reflection section address/clock signal position signaloutputting section 596, a low-reflection section start/end positiondetecting section 599 precisely measures the start point and end pointof the low-reflection section 584 by using an n-1 address detectingsection 597 and address signal or a clock counter 598 and asynchronizing clock signal or demodulation clock. A detailed descriptionwill be made with reference to FIG. 42 in terms of this method. As shownby (1) of FIG. 42 which is a cross-sectional view of an optical disk, alow-reflection section 584 is partially provided as a mark number 1. Areflected light signal as shown by (2) of FIG. 42, i.e., an envelopesignal as shown by (3) of FIG. 42, is outputted, while it becomes lowerthan a light quantity reference value 588. A light quantity levelcomparator 587 detects this fact and a low-reflection light quantitydetecting section 586 outputs a low-reflection light quantity detectionsignal as shown by (5) of FIG. 42.

Secondly, address information and a demodulation clock shown by (6) ofFIG. 42 or a synchronizing clock are used in order to the start and endpositions of the low-reflection light quantity detection signal.Initially, a reference clock 605 of the address n shown by (7) of FIG.42 is measured. If the n-1 address detecting section 597 previouslydetects the address immediately before the address n, it is found thatthe next sync 604 is a sync of the address n. The clock counter 598counts the sync 604 and the number of clocks immediately before thereference clock 605, and this number of clocks is defined as a referencedelay time TD which is measure and recorded by a reference delay time TDmeasuring section 608.

Since the circuit delay time varies in accordance with the reproducingsystem, this reference delay time TD also varies. Thus, a time delaycorrecting section 607 corrects the time using the reference delay timeTD, whereupon it is possible to accurately measure the number of startclocks of the low-reflection section irrespective of the reproducingsystem. As shown by (8) of FIG. 42, by obtaining the start, endaddress•clock number for an optical mark No. 1 of the next track, theclock m+14 of the address n+12 is obtainable. Since TD=m+2, the numberof clocks is corrected to 12, while n+14 is used for the purpose of thedescription.

A description will be made in terms of a low-reflection section addresstable. The low-reflection section 584 is previously measured in thefactory at every disk as shown in FIGS. 3A and 3B so as to draw up alow-reflection section address table 609. This table 609 is encryptedwith a one direction function as shown in FIG. 44 so that as shown inFIG. 15 a low-reflection section group having a bar code configurationand having no reflective layers is recorded at the innermostcircumferential portion of the disk in the second-time reflective layerformation process. It is also appropriate that it is recorded in themagnetic recording section 67 of a CD-ROM as shown in FIG. 38. As shownin FIGS. 3A and 3B, the low-reflection section address tables 609 and609x considerably differ from each other between the legal CD and theillegally duplicated CD. Accordingly, as shown in FIG. 38, the encryptedtable is decrypted to made a normal table which is checked with a checkprogram 535 to distinguish the legal disk from the illegally duplicateddisk, thereby stopping the operation of the illegal disk. In the exampleshown in FIG. 42, the values of the low-reflection section addresstables 609 and 609x are different from each other. As shown by (8) ofFIG. 42, in the legal disk the track next to the mark 1 assumes thestart and end at m+14 and m+267, respectively. On the other hand, asshown by (9) of FIG. 42, in the illegally duplicated disk, the start andend take place at m+21 and m+277 different therefrom. Thus, as shown inFIG. 43, the low-reflection section address tables 609 and 609x aredifferent from each other, thereby allowing the discrimination of theduplicated disk. In the case of CLV, this is achieved using the factthat the address coordinate arrangement of the original record isdifferent as described before. FIG. 45 shows the actual measurementresults about the positions of the addresses of a CD. As obvious fromthe figure, the address coordinates are considerably different from eachother. Moreover, according to the method of this invention, even if theoriginal record is the same, since the reflective film is partiallyremoved in the reflective film formation process, the low-reflectionsection differs at every disk. Accurately removing the reflective filmpartially in units of pits is almost impossible in the ordinary process.For this reason, duplicating the disk made according to this inventionis economically satisfied, which provides a high duplication preventingeffect. FIG. 30 is a flow chart for detection of a duplicated CD due tothe low-reflection section address table, while the description thereofwill be omitted because of repetition.

Secondly, a description will be made in terms of a formation method ofthe low-reflection sections. In the process (2) of FIG. 47, a depositionpreventing section 610 is placed on a substrate of a disk. In theprocess (3) of FIG. 47, the sputtering is carried out, in which case thelow-reflection section 584 with no reflective layer is available. In theprocess (4), the refractive index n1 of the substrate is made to beclose to the refractive index n2 of a protective layer 611, therebyreducing the reflected light quantity on the low-reflection section 584.Since n1=1.55, n2 is set to 3≦n2≦1.7.

In FIG. 48, an ink 612 with a low transmission factor is applied in theprocess (2) and cured with UV (ultraviolet light) in the process (3).Further, in the process (4) a reflective film is given. Since the ink612 has a low transmission factor, the low-reflection section 584 isavailable. In FIG. 49, in the process (2) a light shielding section 613is adhered onto the substrate through an adhesive section 614, and inthe process (3) a reflective film is formed by a first mask at a portionother than optical tracks of the inner circumferential section to makethe low-reflection section 584. In addition, in the process (4) theposition of the low-reflection section 584 is detected by the opticalhead 6 to draw up the low-reflection section address table 609, thenfollowed by the encryption in the process (5). In the process (6), thiscipher data is modulated to a modulated signal such as a bar code dataand recorded as an optical mark on the substrate of a cipher datarecording section 618 by means of a printing section 617 and the ink612. Further, in the process (7) the ink 612 is cured and in the process(8) a reflective film 48 is made by the sputtering or the like using asecond mask 616 which masks portions other than the cipher datarecording section 618. The reflected light quantity decreases at the ink612 portion, thereby forming the second low-reflection section 584. Inthe process (9), an envelope in which the light quantity partiallydecreases is reproduced, and in the process (10) the low-reflectionsection detection signal is reproduced, whereby the cipher data isreproduced by the bar code demodulating section 621. As shown by theprocess (11) of FIG. 49, since in addition to a bar code 620 a characterpattern 622 can also be printed in the cipher data recording section619, the characters for the ID number can be printed at every disk,which allows visible confirmation of the ID number. In FIG. 50, forprinting a circular bar code 620 and character pattern 622 on the cipherdata recording section 619, a heating head 624 having a thermal transferheating section 623 is used so as to partially perform the thermaltransfer of the ink 612, applied onto a film 625, onto the substrate sothat the ink 612 remains on the substrate as shown by the process (2).If necessary, an UV ink is employed and UV-cured in the process (3). Inthe process (4), using the second mask 616 a metallic reflective film isprovided only in the cipher data recording section, whereby the opticalhead 6 is operated in the process (5) so as to obtain a reproducedwaveform as shown by (6) in which attenuation occurs only at thelow-reflection section, thus obtaining a low-reflection sectiondetection signal as shown by (7). As shown in FIG. 49, the digital datais outputted from the bar code demodulator 621 so that a CP mastercipher signal generates. This signal is different at every disk, andtherefore a different physical ID is obtainable at every disk. As shownin FIG. 52 the disk physical ID 626 inherent in each disk, such as thelow-reflection section address table 609 being the physical informationinherent in each disk as described in FIGS. 3A and 3B or a stamperphysical ID 627, such as the physical arrangement table in FIGS. 3A and3B, and a disk managing ID 628 being a serial managing numberarbitrarily given by the soft making company is enciphered as one datatrain with a one direction function cipher encoder so as to make themaster cipher 626. Accordingly, even if the user try to revise the diskmanaging ID 628, the change of the disk physical ID 626 is difficult,with the result that the revision becomes impossible.

This disk physical ID 626 is randomly formed in the CP optical marksection 618 of the FIG. 49 disk so as to have an optical mark as shownin FIG. 41. When this signal is reproduced, as shown in FIG. 53, Theaddress is divided into 10 angular numbers from 0 to 9 for each opticalmark to obtain 10 data so that the disk physical ID 626 of 10 figures,i.e., 32 bits, can be defined. Moreover, as described above the diskphysical ID varies at every disk irrespective of the same originalrecord, and corresponds to a specific disk managing ID 628, whereby itis possible to prevent the revision of the disk managing ID. This cangreatly improve the password security against the release of theprogram. In addition, although a description was made in terms of theembodiment in which the position of the optical mark is detected by theaddress and the number of clocks, the disk physical table 609 as shownin FIG. 53 can be drawn up with a low-reflection section angularposition detecting section 602 of a low-reflection section angularposition signal outputting section 601 outputting a low-reflectionsection angular position signal on the basis of a low-reflection lightquantity detection signal and disk rotational angle information of adisk rotational angle detecting section 335 in FIG. 38.

When a writable layer 630 is provided as shown in FIG. 51, in additionto write a password and the like by a pen, it is possible to prevent themagnetic recording section from being damaged because the writable layer630 becomes thicker. With the characters and bar code for the diskmanaging ID 628 being printed on the writable layer 630, the ID ischeckable at selling agents.

Fifth Embodiment!

The fifth embodiment relates to a method in which an error signal isintentionally disposed as a duplication preventing signal on a disk. Asshown in FIG. 54, a specific error sign 632 is arranged in a specificaddress•clock section of a legal disk 2. This arrangement information isenciphered and recorded as an error sign-address table 631 on the disk2. This encryption information is supplied through a cipher encoder 534to a physical ID outputting section 633. On the other hand, a CP errorsign 632 "11011001" is parity-checked with an error sign list 634 in anerror CP sign detector 633, and the address•clock for the error CP signis outputted from an address•clock position outputting section 635 andchecked with the error sign-address table 631 by a check program 535. Ifthe coincidence number n1 is above a given rate, a decision can be madesuch that it is a legal disk. This error CP sign "11011001" is correctedin an ECC decoder 36e to be outputted as "11011011". Thus, the outputdata provides no problem. On the other hand, in an illegally duplicateddisk 2a, since an ordinary sign 635 after the error correction isduplicated, it differs from the CP error sign of the legal disk 2. Inthis case, the output data is the same "11011011 as the that of thelegal disk 2. However, the number of the error signs to be detected bythe error CP sign detector 633 is small and the error-sign-address tableand the arrangement of the error signs do not coincide, and hence thecheck program 535 decides that it is a duplicated disk, which stops itsoperation. Thus, it is possible to realize a duplication preventingdisk. In this case, since the duplication preventing desk is made onlywith the change of the signal and the addition of the error CP signdetecting section 633, the system can have a simplified structure.

Secondly, a description will be made with reference to FIG. 56 in termsof a method of accomplishing the copy protection (CP) using a specialEFM translation table 636. In the EFM translation, the original data 637is modulated to the standard sign 635 "00100001000010" which in turn, isdecoded to the modulated data 638 in an EFM decoder 592. In theduplication preventing disk 2, a CP special sign 639 is recorded inplace of the standard sign 635 for a specific address only. In the caseof the EFM demodulation, the sign is decoded to the ordinary data 638"01101111". For this reason, distinguishing can not be made with onlythe output data.

A detailed arrangement will be described with reference to a blockdiagram of FIG. 55. For the legal disk 2, a CP special sign detectingsection 646 detects a CP special sign 6639 and a CP special sign addressoutputting section 641 outputs the CP special sign address. In a legaldisk checking section 535, it is checked with a CP special sign-addresstable 642 decoded by the cipher decoder 534. If the checked valueexceeds a reference value n0, a decision is made such that it is thelegal disk. Since only the standard signal 635 is recorded in theillegally duplicated disk 2a, the CP special sign detecting section 640does not generate the CP special sign detection signal except that anerror occurs. Accordingly, a legal disk check section decides that it isan illegal disk, thus stopping the operation.

Thus, the employment of the EFM special translation table 636 allows thecopy prevention at the stage of the modulation signal. As compared withFIG. 54 error special sign method, the duplication becomes moredifficult. In addition, the structure becomes simple because of thechange of the signal only.

Sixth Embodiment!

A description will be made in terms of the sixth embodiment whichinvolves an install managing method using the master cipher 629 and adealer code. FIG. 58 illustrates an entire operational flow of asub-cipher decoder 643. This flow chart is composed of three main stepsof a soft company process step 405a, a dealer process step 405 and auser process step 405c. First, in the soft company process step 405a, asdescribed in the FIG. 52 first embodiment, a master cipher encoder 537in the lump enciphers an original record ID 627 inherent in the originalrecord, a disk physical ID 626, a disk managing ID 628 such as a serialnumber, and a sub-cipher decoder number ns, for example, ns=151, to makea master cipher 629. With this operation, the prevention of revision ispossible. One dealer number ns is given to each dealer or servicecenter. In each disk, a sub-cipher decoder number ns 644 (for example,ns=151) is set in the master cipher 629. Accordingly, a sub-cipher 645in the FIG. 57 disk can be encodeed only by a sub-cipher encoder 646whose dealer number is 151. In this disk, the sub-cipher decoder 647 isset with the ns (for example, ns=151) and the master cipher 629.Accordingly, even if the encoding is tried with a sub-cipher encoder 646different in number, the operation does not start. Thus, only the dealerwhose ns=151 can treat the ns=151 cipher encoder 646a for the diskcontrol such as the release of the program and setting of the number ofmachines to which the install is allowable.

Furthermore, in the dealer process step 405b, a sub-management data isproduced which includes the disk physical ID 626 and further includesthe disk managing ID 628, the number 650 of machines to which theinstall is limited, the time limit 651 for use, the service password andso on. The ns=151 dealer makes a secrete of the sub-management data 649and encrypts it with his ns=151 sub-cipher encoder 646a to make asub-cipher 645. This sub-cipher 645 is recorded in the magneticrecording section of the disk 2.

Still further, in the user process step 405c, the master cipher 629 isreproduced so that the master managing data 648 is decoded with themaster cipher decoder 534. The original record duplication is checkedwith the original record physical ID thereof, and the revision of the IDnumber is checked with the disk physical ID 626 and the disk managing ID628. The sub-cipher decoder number 644 is decoded, and in a step 405dthe sub-cipher decoder number ns (for example, ns=151) is selected. Inthe optical ROM section of the disk 2 there are recorded the sub-cipherdecode programs (for example 001 to 999) and data enciphered. Thespecific, i.e., ns=151, data is reproduced therefrom and the ns=151sub-cipher decoder 647 is decoded through the master cipher decoder 534.In this case, since the sub-cipher decoder is enciphered, the revisionis impossible. The sub-cipher decoder 647 decodes the sub-managementdata 549 on the basis of the sub-cipher. Since the physical ID 626 isincluded in the sub-management data 549, the data revision is checkable.In addition, since the number 650 of the install-done machines, the timelimit 651 in use and the release program number 652 are recorded, it ispossible to limit the program number released and the number of theinstall-allowable machines. This setting can arbitrarily be carried outby the dealer. Accordingly, taking the selling situation of disks andsofts into consideration, the dealers staying in areas of countries canperform the most suitable setting.

The FIG. 57 operational flow will further be described with reference toa flow chart of FIG. 58. In FIG. 58, in addition to a disk fabricatingroutine 405a for the soft company and a disk use limit routine 405b fora dealer, there are newly provided a program use-allowing routine 405dfor the dealer and an install routine 405c for the user. First, in thedisk fabricating routine 405a, an original record is fabricated in anoriginal record fabricating step 410a and the original record physicalID such as the address-coordinate table and error-address table areextracted. A disk substrate is made on the basis of the original recordand in a first metallic reflective film producing step 410b a physicalfeature different at every disk is made, for example, in such a manneras intermittently providing low-reflection sections with no reflectivelayer as described above, before the disk physical ID being extracted.

A serial number generating step 410c is executed to generate a diskmanaging ID with a serial number different at every disk and designatesa sub-cipher decoder number ns, and a step 410d is executed to encipherit with a master cipher decoder to make a disk master cipher, andfurther a step 410e is implemented to record on each disk a recordingnumber such as a circular bar code, different at every disk, in a secondmetallic reflective film process. Or, in a step 410f it is recorded inthe magnetic recording layer before the fabrication of the disk 2. Inthe dealer step 405b for the next number ns, a step 410g is executed tomake a dealer sub-management data 649, and a step 410h is implemented tomake a disk sub-cipher by a sub-cipher encoder 646 with the number ns,and further a step 410i is executed to record it in the magneticrecording layer.

In the next user install routine 405c, a machine ID is read out andregistered in a machine ID recording area 655 of an install managingdata 654, then followed by a step 410k to record the machine ID in anHDD and to confirm an install-allowable flag 653 with a basic programnumber that the install is permitted in the disk 2. Flags 653a, 653b and653c show the install permissions to the machines with ID1, ID2 and ID3,respectively. In the illustration, the install is allowed to the machineID1 and machine ID3. After the install, a step 410m follows to recordall the install managing data 653. Subsequently, a step 410n is executedto perform the operation for a new program np being installed for a fee,then followed by a step 410p to make additional install managing data654a when the new program np is newly installed the machine ID1 andmachine ID3. In the data, the install allowing flag 653 rises on installallowing flags 653f and 653h. This data is transmitted to the dealer. Inthe dealer use allowing routine 405d, a step 410u is for the dealer tocheck the receipt of the fee for the program install. If "YES", theoperational flow goes to a step 410v to encipher the additional installmanaging data 654a with the sub-cipher encoder No. ns, and then advancesto a step 410w to make an install managing number, which in turn, isdelivered to the user. The user receives the install managing number 655in a step 410q, and decodes the cipher with the sub-cipher decoder No.ns to decode the additional install managing data 645a in a step 410s,and further install the new program in a step 410t. At this time, in astep 410x, the decoded physical ID data is checked with the physical IDdata measured from the disk. If OK, the operational flow proceeds to astep 410z to start to install the program np. If the revision has beenmade, the physical IDs are not coincident with each other, therebypreventing the illegal revision. In this case, of the additional programnp, the instal allowing flags 653a and 653c assume "1", which permitsthe program install for the machine ID1 and machine ID3.

Seventh Embodiment!

Furthermore, as the seventh embodiment, there are described a method ofrecording data by the second low-reflection section described in thefourth embodiment and a fabricating method. FIG. 5 shows a method ofenciphering the address-coordinate position information 532 to record itin the optical recording section of the original record. On the otherhand, when as shown in FIG. 15 the address-coordinate positioninformation 532 is encrypted to make a bar code like mask pattern toform a reflective film including a bar code like non-reflective portion,the bar code pattern is reproducible through the optical head 6. In thiscase, for the reproduction of the duplication preventing signal, it isalso possible that the optical reproduction surface and the protectivelayer 610 opposite thereto are made to be transparent and, in additionto the optical head 6, an optical sensor is provided at the oppositesurface side to read out the bar code. Further, when the clock signal isdesigned to be reproduced from the bar code to perform the rotationalcontrol of the motor, a constant speed rotation of the motor is possibleat recording to the magnetic recording section. As shown in FIG. 46 theaddress position of the copy protect optical mark and the pitarrangement are detected to distinguish between the legal disk and theillegally duplicated disk to remove the illegal disk. Although an RSAfunction is employed as the cipher function, it is also appropriate touse an elliptical curve function or DES function instead. In FIG. 59,the angular position relationship between the optical mark 387 and theaddress position vary at every disk. Therefore, it is also possible thatthe angular difference is treated as the disk physical ID.

The seventh embodiment employs a method different from the fabricatingmethod of the fourth embodiment. That is, as shown in FIG. 60 the barcode like low-reflection section 584 is made by means of a lasertrimming device. In a first laser trimming process shown by (3) and (4),a light beam from a laser 643 is operated to take a scanning movementthrough a laser scanner 644 to make a non-linear pattern 653 so that alow-reflection section 584 is formed in the process (4). According tothis invention, as shown by (3) the laser cutting is made zigzag but notlinearly. For this reason, in this invention the low-reflection sectionis detected in units of 1T, and for the duplication of the diskaccording to this invention, it is required that the cutting be made inunits of pits, i.e., with accuracy below 0.8 μm in both the vertical andhorizontal directions. On the other hand, since the accuracy of thegeneral-use laser scanner is above 10 μm, the duplication of thenon-reflective section 584 is impossible through the equipmentcommercially available.

As well as in FIG. 49, as shown in FIG. 61 an ID mark is made at randomby the laser trimming in the process (3) and the address of the ID markand the clock number are detected in the process (5) and these data andthe logical ID are enciphered in the lump. In the second laser trimmingprocess (6) this cipher is recorded as a pulse width modulated signalsuch a bar code, with the result that the disk ID number different atevery disk and impossible in revision is formed in the optical recordingsection of a CD. As shown in FIG. 67, in the process (2) the physicalarrangement information 532 of the original record is in advancedetected and encrypted through the cipher encoder 537 so that a CP barcode signal is made in a pulse width modulating section 656. Further, inthe process (3) a portion of the inner circumferential section or outercircumferential section of the original record completed is removed bymeans of the laser trimming to provide a portion with no pit at thepulse width of the CP bar code signal. Only data comprising 0s arrangedsuccessively is reproduced from this area. In the process (7) the barcode pulse duration is measured in a PWM demodulating section 621, thusdemodulating the copy protect data. The user can detect the duplicateddisk in this way. Further, as well as in FIG. 32, as shown in FIG. 68the disk 2 is completed from the first original record 573 in theprocess (6), and the physical arrangement information 532 of the firstoriginal record 575 is encrypted and recorded so as to fabricate asecond original record 575a. In addition, in the process (8) atransparent layer whose thickness is 30 μm is provided on the firstreflective film 48, and pits are formed on the basis of the secondoriginal record 575a in accordance with the well-known 2P method beforethe second reflective film 48a is formed. Thus, the physical arrangementinformation 532 of the first reflective film 48 is recorded on thesecond reflective film 48a, which can realize a highly duplicationpreventing disk.

A detailed description will be made with reference to FIGS. 39 and 97 interms of a recording method and detecting method for the secondlow-reflection section 751a recorded in the recording medium 2. First,as shown in FIG. 97 a plurality of second low-reflection sections 751are set in a TOC area 752 of the recording medium 2. Due to the presenceof the second low-reflection sections 751, data error takes place. Thatis, the area of the second low-reflection sections 751 is excessivelylarge, there is a possibility that the normal signal does not develop.As means to avoid this, this invention employs two ways. The first wayis, as shown in FIG. 97, to provide an area 758 with no secondlow-reflection sections on a track including the second low-reflectionsection area 759. In this case, the area 758 with no secondlow-reflection sections is required to be larger than a 1-track TOCinformation area 760. Thus, even if the data is not decoded at all fromthe second low-reflection section area 759, the data is completelyreproducible from the second low-reflection are 760. Accordingly,assuming that the length of the area 758 on the track is taken as dN andthe length of the 1-track TOC information area on the track is taken tobe dT, if dN>dT, the TOC data corresponding to one track isreproducible. If the reproduction is surely made with one revolution,only dN>2dY is required as a condition. Since for CD-ROMs only the datacorresponding to one track is recorded in TOC, if dN>2dT, the TOC datacan surely be reproduced with one revolution. In the case of the CD-ROM,since dt=approximately 15 mm, as long as the portion not having secondlow-reflection section is provided by length of about 3 cm in onerevolution, all the remaining portions can be used for the bar codeserving as the second reflection section.

Secondly, a description will be made in terms of the interval dr betweenthe second low-reflection sections 751a and the like in the secondlow-reflection section area. If the interval is excessively made narrow,the frame synchronizing signal is difficult to detect, so that therotational control becomes impossible. For instance, the secondreflective section is about 10 microns in width. For Cds the intervalbetween the frame synchronizing signals is 180 microns, and therefore,if dr is 36 microns, the probability that the frame synchronizing signalis broken is 1/4 so that the rotation servo operates. One of two framesynchronizing signals is needed. Accordingly, assuming that the averagewidth of the second reflective section is taken as dw, if at leastdw<dr, the rotational control becomes possible.

The second way is that, in the case where the data amount to be recordedin the second low-reflection section 751 is small, the interval 753,i.e., dr, between the second low-reflection sections 751 is set to belarger than the interleaving length dI, i.e., dr>dI. This allows thecorrection of the data error.

Moreover, a description will be made with reference to FIG. 97 in termsof a method of recording the ID number and a secrete key 771 such as theRSA cipher for the cipher communication. In the FIG. 97 recordingsystem, a mixing means 548 mixes the first physical feature information,ID number, and the secrete key 771 from a secrete key generating means761, which the mixture is in the lump enciphered in an encryption meansand modulated in a PWM, or bar code, modulating means 763. In addition,a portion of the reflective film is removed by means of a recordingmeans 762 such as the aforesaid laser trimming device, thereby creatingthe bar code-like second low-reflection section 751 as shown in FIG. 61.For the reproduction, the reproduced signal from the optical head isdemodulated by a PWM, or bar code, demodulating means 763 and thesecrete key is separated therefrom in a secrete key outputting section765 so that the secrete information such as the code figure of a creditcard to be transmitted is outputted from a communication data outputtingsection 767. The secrete information is enciphered with the secrete key771 in a cipher encoder 767 having a one direction function such as theRSA function to create the second cipher, which is transmitted from acommunication section 768 through a communication line 774 such as aninternet to a second computer 770.

In the second computer 770, a communication section 769 receives thesecond cipher and a cipher decoder 774 searches the secrete key 771 froman ID number 776 of a corresponding table 775 to decode the secondcipher on the basis of the secrete key 771. In this way, the code figureof credit card of the user is available in the second computer 770. Theinternet provides a problem in that the data security is low. However,according to this invention, a unique ID number and the communicationsecrete key independent of the ID number are recorded in the CD-ROMdelivered to the user, whereupon the user can order a product to thesecond computer in accordance with a catalogue for shopping or the likeincluded in the CD-ROM and, when giving the code figure of the creditcard, send the information enciphered with the secrete key. On the otherhand, the second computer can surely decode it with the secrete key 771of the corresponding table 775. In the case of using the CD-ROM, theinternet security drastically improves.

Eighth Embodiment!

In the eighth embodiment, the inphase and negative-phase (antiphase)pits are detected as the second physical feature information. As shownin FIG. 62A, when detecting the address An, a control section 10supplies an on-track switching signal to a tracking control circuit 24,and a track servo polarity inverting circuit 646 inverts the polarity ofa tracking servo circuit 24a, there results in the change from theon-tracking state, i.e., traveling state on pits 46, as shown in FIG.62B to the reverse polarity servo state as shown in FIG. 62C. Further,since a pattern comprising pits 46a and 46b is controlled to be locatedat ends of optical sensors 648a and 648b, the light beam travels betweenthe two adjacent tracks. As shown in FIG. 62C, when the pits 46a and 46bof the adjacent tracks are in phase with each other, the crosstalksignals thereof are emphasized to produce an inphase reproduced signal650. When being not in phase with each other, the normal signal does notoccur. In particular, in the case of being 180-degree out-of-phase, thecrosstalk signals are cancelled each other so that a signal whoseamplitude does not vary is reproduced.

As shown in FIG. 63, when the off-track signal of all the data isreproduced from a CD, a plurality of pits 46 of the adjacent tracks arecompletely coincident and in phase with each other at an extremely lowprobability. In this area the continuous inphase signal blocks 653a,653b and 653c are detectable for a given time period Ts. When jumpingfrom a specific address An to an off-track, only the inphase blocks 653are selected and extracted which reach the frame sync signal 654a of theinphase block S1. Further, the address An, arrangement angle θn andinphase reproduction codes 652a, 652b are stored in the original recordphysical ID table 532. This table is recorded in a bar code-likenon-reflective section of an optical ROM section of the CD, or recordedin the magnetic recording section. For the reproduction of the CD, theoriginal record physical arrangement table 532 is reproduced from themagnetic reproducing section of optical reproducing section in FIG. 62and fed to the checking section 535. As shown in FIG. 63, on the basisof this data, the angle is set to 0 at the address Ak and then thejumping to the off-track is made at the address A1. The frame syncsignal 654a is detected and at this time the angle θ1 is measured.Simultaneously, the inphase reproduction code 652a "100010001001" andthe negative-phase reproduction code "0000000" are reproduced. Thechecking section 535 checks whether or not the measurement data iscoincident with the original record physical ID table 532. If notcoincident therewith, the output/operation stopping section 536 stopsthe operation or output of the program. A similar check is made to theinphase block 653b of the address A2 so as to check whether or not theangle θ2 of the frame sync signal of the inphase reproduction signal andthe inphase reproduction code 652 "10010010001" coincide with theoriginal record physical ID table 532.

In FIG. 63 method, the check is made as to whether or not the inphasereproduction code 652 of the inphase block is in coincidence. Forduplicating this portion, the pit positions of the adjacent tracks areneeded to be precisely formed with the accuracy of period T=0.5T at afrequency of 4.3 MHz. This accuracy is impossible except that theoriginal record is cut at CAV. At the same time, the angular position Onof the frame sync signal 654a is measured. The portion between theinphase blocks 653a and 653b is recorded with CLV. Accordingly, thehigh-accuracy recording is required with CLV for the coincidence of theangular position θn. That is, for the angle θn being completelycoincident with the inphase reproduction code, CLV control is made withthe accuracy of 0.5T to fabricate the original record. Thus, realizingthis by the existing systems is impossible, and the combination of theangle θn and the inphase reproduction code allows the prevention ofduplication of the original record.

In FIG. 63, the frame synchronizing signals 729a and 729b of the twoadjacent tracks become in phase with each other, and the area in whichthe inphase frame synchronizing signal 654a is detectable is found andused as the first physical feature information. As shown in FIG. 93A,because of CLV recording, as the rotational angle θ increases, thenumber of the recording pulses per one revolution increases as indicatedby a curve 730a. In the case of the disk manufactured with CAV, themotor rotates at a constant speed, which allows the duplication of therecording signal with accuracy of 0.5T. On the other hand, in the caseof the disk manufactured with CLV, the operation is performed at aconstant linear velocity, and hence it is impossible to accuratelyduplicate the angles at which the pits are arranged. Since the disk ofthis invention is manufactured with CLV, it is impossible to achieve thehigh angular accuracy by the ordinary original record fabricatingapparatus for CLV or CAV when manufacturing the disk. However, in FIG.93A, if, taking note of the fact that the number of the recording pulsesbetween a pair of inphase recording signals 731a and 731b at the pointsA and B separated by one revolution is n0, a constant rotational angularvelocity by which the number of recording pulses per revolution becomesjust n0 is calculated and the system is switched from CLV to CAV only inthe A-B area so that the motor rotates at a speed for CAV and the CAVrecording is made only in the A-B area, the recording corresponding tothe curve 730b becomes possible. That is, if a CLV/CAV switching typeoriginal record fabricating apparatus is developed in future, theduplication of the points A and B would be possible with accuracy of0.5T in the two-point system, while the life, i.e., the time period fromthe elimination of the protect to the release of a pirate edition,lengthens from 3 years to 5 years.

FIG. 92 illustrates a three-point coincidence system taken when there isa need for a higher protect level. In the three-point coincidencesystem, the first physical feature information is obtained from aninphase area 732 in which three frame synchronizing signals 729a, 729b,729c of the adjacent tracks 727a, 727b, 727c are arranged in phase witheach other. Although the probability that the three frame synchronizingsignals are in phase with each other is low, according to theprobability calculation, there are 63 areas per disk in the case ofCD-ROM. In other words, there are several areas on any CD-ROM. Thus, itis possible to use the three-point coincidence system, i.e., employ thetwo inphase frame signals as the first physical feature information.

A description will be made in terms of a detection method similar to theFIG. 63 method. In the pit arrangement shown by (1) of FIG. 92, Inresponse to the detection of a mark signal 726a subsequent to a specificAn address 725a in a track 727a, the tracking is jumped toward the outercircumferential side and the polarity of the track servo is inverted asshown in FIG. 62 to carry out the off-track travelling, thereby jumpingto an off-track 728a between the track 727a and a track 727b. Thus, theoff-track section of the inphase signal area 732 is reached so that aninphase frame synchronizing signal 654a is outputted as shown by awaveform A in (2) of FIG. 92. The frame synchronizing signal has amaximum pit length of 11T and, hence, is easily distinguishable fromother pits. In a reproduced clock waveform shown by (4) of FIG. 92,checking is made as to whether or not the count number ns of pulses froma mark signal 726a of a reproduced clock signal 733 is coincident withthe number of pulses 734 in advance included in the first physicalfeature information in FIG. 63, whereby it is possible to preventanother inphase frame synchronizing signal from being detected in error.After the detection of the inphase frame synchronizing signal 654a, thejumping is made from an on-track 728a to an on-track 727a at the outercircumferential portion to confirm an address 727d, i.e., Ap+1, wherebyconfirmation can be made such that the detected inphase framesynchronizing signal 654a is an inphase signal of the tracks 727a and727b, thus improving the security.

Furthermore, a description will be made in terms of a method ofdetecting an inphase frame synchronizing signal 654b between the tracks727a and 727c. After the detection of the address 725a in the pitarrangement shown by (1) of FIG. 92, the jumping is made to a track inthe inner circumferential side and the polarity of the track servo isreversed and the travelling is made on the off-track 728b, whereby asshown by a waveform B in (5) of FIG. 92 the inphase frame synchronizingsignal 654b is detectable as long as it is a legal disk. Subsequently,the jumping is further made to a track 727c closer to the outermostcircumferential portion and a given address 727e is detected, whereby itis possible to confirm the off-tracking between the tracks 727a and727c. This permits the detection of the inphase frame synchronizingsignals at three points.

As shown by a curve 730c in FIG. 93B, the inphase signals are arrangedat three points at an interval of 360 degrees with accuracy in unit ofsubmicron, while the number of recording pulses is n0 between A and Band n0+Δn0 between B and C. Accordingly, in the case of performing theCAV recording, although the portion between A and B is duplicable, theportion between B and C takes the curve 730d whereby the point C is notduplicable (only the point C' is duplicable). That is, the number ofrecording pulses lacks by Δn0 and hence difficulty is encountered toduplicate this by the CAV/CLV switching type original record fabricatingapparatus. Thus, the three-point coincidence method increases the degreeof difficulty in duplication to more effectively prevent the fabricationof the pirate optical disk.

FIG. 94 is an illustration for describing the degree of difficulty induplication in the case that a track in which two inphase recordingsignal areas exist in one revolution is used as the first physicalfeature information, which is higher than the degree of difficulty inthe two-point coincidence system. In the case of the three-pointcoincidence system shown in FIG. 93B, the degree of difficulty induplication becomes high, while the duplication may be possible with aclock control system being incorporated into the CAV/CLV switching type.However, in FIG. 94, if in addition the points A and B, the points C andD are provided in one revolution as indicated on a curve 730e toconstitute a four-point coincidence system, a technique is requiredwhich measures the point C with angular accuracy of 10-7, whereby theduplication becomes extremely difficult. In addition to theaforementioned clock control system there is needed an angle detectingmeans with an extremely high accuracy, which relies on a technique whichwould be developed in future. Thus, if as shown in FIG. 94 thefour-point coincidence system is employed, i.e., two or more areasincluding the inphase recording pits are provided in one revolution andused as the first physical feature information, the duplication becomesextremely difficult.

Ninth Embodiment!

The ninth embodiment involves the detection of dirt or dust on a disk.As described above, a disk such as a CD according to the embodiment ofthis invention has a magnetic recording layer on its label surface. Whenas shown in FIG. 64A foreign substances 655a, 655b, 655c such as dustexist on the magnetic recording layer, the recording characteristicdeteriorates, In a reproduction output detecting section 657 in FIG. 40,the reproduced output and a reproduction output reference value 658 arecompared with each other, by which comparison the deteriorating state isdetectable. In this case, since the relative angle is found by a diskrotational angle detecting section 335, the position of the track, onwhich the foreign substances 655 are present, and the angular positionOD are detectable. With the position of the optical surface and angulardeviation of the printed label being recorded on the magnetic recordinglayer, it is possible to calculate the angle of the output-loweringportion on the label-printed surface. In addition to the label-printingangles, the reproduced-output lowering sections 659 are displayed as theoutput-lowering marks 660a, 660b, 660c on a window 567 of a displaysection 16 as shown in FIG. 64B, whereby the user can recognize theplaces at which the foreign substances 655 exist and can easily removethe foreign substances 655. If the coordinates defined by vertical lines1 to 7 and horizontal lines A to G are set in both the disk 2 and thedisplay section window 567. FIG. 65 illustrates an example of an errormessage to the users on the windows 567a and 567b. FIG. 66 illustrates aforeign substance cleaning instruction routine in detail. In FIG. 66, inthe case of recording a track Tn in a step 471a, a step 471d is executedto reproduce the track Tn and a step 471f is then executed to checkwhether or not the output of a reproduced-output detecting section 657is above a reference value. If being below the reference value, theoperational flow goes to a step 471i. If this is the first time, a step47lj is implemented to display the FIG. 65 error message for diskcleaning, before the disk is ejected. Further, the operational flowreturns to the step 471d. If the output level is above the referencevalue, the recording is performed. On the other hand, if not above thereference value, the operational flow advances to a step 471r to havethe disk again cleaned by the user. If the reproduced output is notrestored irrespective of cleaning it three times, the operational flowproceeds to a step 471x to abandon the track Tn. At the same time, thedata is recreated from the interleave data on another track and recordedon a new track Tn+t. Thereafter, the recording or reproduction iscompleted in a step 471z.

Tenth Embodiment!

In the tenth embodiment, an offset signal is detected as the secondphysical feature information. As shown by a waveform (2) of FIG. 31, thepulse width of the signal is changed on the basis of the offset signalduring the cutting of the original record for change of the duty ratio,whereby an offset voltage ΔVs develops as shown in a waveform (5). Thisis detectable by detecting the difference, i.e., the offset voltage ΔVs,between the reference slice level voltage and the slice level voltagefrom a slice level Vs outputting section 38b of a waveform-shapingcircuit 38a in FIG. 40. In FIG. 38, the offset voltage arrangementinformation of the disk physical configuration table 532 is checked withthe angular position or address arrangement from an offset voltagedetecting section 660, whereby the detection of an illegally duplicateddisk is possible.

Eleventh Embodiment

A description will be made in terms of a method of stopping theoperation of a program on a pirate disk and a method of stopping theoperation of a program illegally copied. Since it is designed to betreated in a CPU 665 of a personal computer 676 including a disk driveas shown in FIG. 69, the description is made of the difference inhardware from FIG. 40. In FIG. 69, a second demodulator 662 different insystem from an MFM demodulator 30d is provided as a demodulator of themagnetic reproducing circuit. The switching between the seconddemodulator 662 and the MFM demodulator 30d is made through a switchingsection 661. Since the corresponding modulator is placed only in thefactory, the reproduction is possible but the complete recording isimpossible. For this reason, in the case where the area speciallymodulated in the factory is recorded, the specially modulated signal isnot recorded. In the drive side, the control is made by the CPU 665 suchthat the recording is impossible except that the specially modulatedsignal in the area is reproduced. Accordingly, it can be considered as alogical "write once" area and the recording can be done once. If themachine ID is recorded in this area, it becomes difficult to revise itby the user's drive. This prevents the install from being made tomachines whose number is larger than the number of the machines allowed.In addition, the prevention of the start-up or operation of the programwith the same ID number is monitored through an HDD of a second personalcomputer 663 connected through an interface 14 to a network 664, therebypreventing the operation of the soft illegally copied. The operation ofthe CPU 665 including the foregoing operation will be described withreference to a flow chart.

FIG. 70 is a flow chart for describing the operation for installing aprogram. After the confirmation of the insertion of a disk in a step666a, in a step 666b the install starts in response to an installinstruction. In a step 666c the display on the user's name and user'senvironment is made on an input screen so that the user inputs at leastthe user's name. If inputted, the operational flow goes to a step 667,acting as a legal disk checking routine, where check is made as towhether it is a leal disk or a pirate disk. A detailed description willbe made with reference to FIG. 72. The control enters into a checkroutine 667a, then followed by a step 667b to reproduce the opticaldisk, more specifically, to reproduce a serial number enciphered with aone direction function and recorded in the optical disk and different atevery disk, and the information on the cipher decoder. In a step 667c,this cipher is converted into a plain text (non-ciphered text) throughthe cipher decoder so as to obtain the ID number and physical featureinformation designated at 532 in FIG. 38. In a step 667d the diskphysical feature information is measured to obtain the measured physicalfeature information which in turn, is checked with the aforesaidplain-text physical feature information. The detailed description willbe omitted because of being made above. A step 667e is for checkingwhether or not the check result shows the coincidence. If not, in a step667f the display indicative of "duplicated disk" is made on the screenand the program is stopped. On the other hand, if "YES", the operationalflow proceeds to a step 668 to implement the machine IDcheck•fabrication•recording routine. A detailed description of this stepwill be made with reference to a flow chart of FIG. 73. First, in a step668a all the machine ID numbers installed are read out from the magneticrecording section, i.e., a write once layer 679 in FIG. 76, of anoptical disk, and then the ID number inherent in a personal computer andrecorded in an HDD or ROMIC of the personal computer is read out so asto be checked with the machine ID numbers. If the decision result of astep 668b indicates the coincidence, the operational flow goes to a step668m to exit from this routine. On the other hand, if no coincidence, astep 668c is executed to confirm, from the magnetic recording section,whether or not there is still present the flag indicating the remainingnumber of times of install to machines. If the answer of a step 668d is"NO", the operational flow goes to a step 668e so that the operationstops. On the other hand, if the answer is "YES", the operational flowproceeds to a step 668f to check whether or not the machine ID ispresent in the personal computer body or HDD. If "YES", the controljumps to a step 668h. If "NO", a step 668g is implemented so that therandom number generator generates the machine ID which is recorded inthe HDD. The next step 668h is executed for checking whether or not theinstall of the soft into the HDD has been completed. If "NO", thecontrol jumps to the step 668m. In this case, there is no pass. On theother hand, if "YES", a new machine ID for this personal computer isrecorded in the magnetic recording section, i.e., write once layer 679,of the optical disk. If OK in a step 668j, the operational flow goes tothe step 668m to exit from this routine. In this routine, because of theuse of the write once layer 679, the user's drive can not revise themachine ID, which prevents the illegal dubbing. Thereafter, theoperational flow goes to a step 666f in FIG. 70. The install operationstarts in a step 666g and the legal cipher decoder checking routine isimplemented in a step 669x. This routine will be described in detailwith reference to FIG. 74. A step 669a is executed to read out thecipher decode program recorded in the program installed and a step 669bis subsequently executed to read out specific encrypted data from theprogram or HDD, then followed by a step 669c to convert the data into aplain text through the cipher decode program. A step 669d is implementedin order to check whether or not it is right. If right, in a step 669fthe plain-texted data is incorporated as a portion into the program afor operation. The operation is checked in a step 669g. If it is notgood, the operational flow advances to a step 669h to stop the program.If OK, the control advances through a step 669i. In this case, theoperational flow returns to a step 666h in FIG. 70 wherein, checking theinstall-allowable flag 653 described with reference to FIG. 58, and if,for example, the third install-allowable flag is vacant, the figure ofthe basic program number "00000001" is taken up one place so as to issuethe program licence ID number IDn "000000013" which in turn, is given tothe program to be installed in the HDD before recorded. When the installof the program is completed in a step 666i, a step 666j follows to checkwhether or not the machine ID for this personal computer has beenrecorded in the HDD and optical disk. If "YES", the operational flowproceeds to a step 666k. If "NO", the operational flow advances to astep 668x to perform the machine ID check•Drawing-up•recording routineand then carry out the operation which has already described withreference to FIG. 73. Although the same explanation will be omitted,since at this time the basic install has been completed, the answer ofthe step 668h turns YES whereby the new machine ID is recorded in themagnetic recording section of the optical disk in the step 668i. Inaddition, when the step 668j decides the completion, the control passesthrough the step 668m to exit from this routine. Thereafter, theoperational flow returns to the step 666k to record the user's name onthe write once layer 679 in FIG. 76 and to record the environmentsetting information on a rewritable layer 680. Since the user side drivecan not revise the user's name as described above, it is possible toexpose the illegally copying person and hence to provide the copypreventing effect. In a step 666m, the physical address arrangement ofthe installed program in the HDD, for example, the start/end FATinformation and/or the mark information of the install ID, is recordedin the HDD and used as the copy detection information afterwards. If OKin a step 666n, the operational flow goes to a step 666p to eject thedisk and then to a step 666q to complete all the install. According tothis invention, the disk check allows the elimination of the pirateedition, and the check on the replacement of the cipher decoder improvesits security.

The operational flow subsequent to FIG. 70 will be described withreference to FIG. 71. With the above operation, the program is onceinstalled in the HDD 682 in FIG. 69. When the start-up instruction forthis program is inputted in a step 671a, an illegal copied-soft usestopping routine is operated in a step 670x. A detailed description ofthis sub-routine will be made with reference to FIG. 75. The operationcomprises four blocks: a routine 672 for stopping the operation of thesoft with the same ID number, a program movement detecting step 673, amachine ID checking routine 674 and a cipher decoder checking step 675.First, a description is made in terms of the block 672. A step 672a isexecuted to read out the licence IDn of the program previously givenfrom the optical disk, and a step 672b is implemented to check, from thenetwork 664 by the network section 14 in FIG. 69, whether or not theprogram with the same IDn is in operation in the HDD of the secondpersonal computer 663. If the program with the same IDn is found in astep 672c, the operational flow goes to a step 672d to display themassage "operation is not allowed because the soft with the same IDnumber is in operation" on the display section 16 and to stop it. On theother hand, if "NO" indicative of no same ID, the operational flowadvances to a step 673a to reproduce the arrangement information Ac suchas the FAT information of the program in the legal HDD or a legal markMc recorded at a portion other than the program area during the legalinstall. In a step 673b, the arrangement address such as the FAT of theprogram in the HDD is measured to obtain Ap or reproduce the legal markMp, then followed by a step 673c to check Ac=Ap or Mc=Mp. If the answeris "NO", since at least it is considered that the program is moved toanother HDD, a step 673d follows to display "re-insertion of opticaldisk. If the optical disk is not inserted in a step 673e, the operationstops. On the other hand, if inserted, the legal disk checking routinedescribed with reference to FIG. 72 is implemented in order to checkwhether it is a legal disk. In addition, in a step 673g check is made asto whether the ID number of the program is coincident with the ID numberof the optical disk. If OK, the operational flow goes to a step 674a toreproduce the legal machine ID given to the program, which is checkedwith the machine ID of the personal computer in which the program isstored or the machine ID of the HDD. If "NO", the control enters into astep 674c, i.e., the machine ID check•draw-up•recording routine 668described with reference to FIG. 73. The machine ID is checked and newlyrecorded. If the answer of a step 674d is "NO", the operation stops. IfOK, the operational flow goes to a step 675a to check the cipherencoder. This routine is the same as that of FIG. 74, and thedescription thereof will be omitted. When the answer of the step 674b is"NO", this means that the cipher decoder is replaced. Accordingly, astep 675c is executed to display "no install from legal disk" and theoperation stops. If the answer of the step 674b is OK, the operationalflow goes to a step 670a and further advances to the next step 671b inFIG. 71. The program is started in a step 671w. If OK, in response to afile reading instruction in a step 671c, the illegal copy use stoppingroutine is also activated in a step 670y. If OK, the file is read out ina step 671e. Further, when a step 671f decides a print instruction and astep 671h decides a file save instruction, the illegal copy soft usestopping routine comes into operation. If OK, the printing or file saveoperation is put into practice. Thus, since the soft copy is checked atthe time of each instruction, it is possible to stop the use of the softillegally copied into another personal computer in a network. Thecombination of the copy preventing method and pirate edition preventingmethod based on a one direction function in this invention provides ahigh degree of security.

Twelfth Embodiment!

The twelfth embodiment is made in connection with an MPEG scramblerelease key. FIG. 77 illustrates an MPEG scramble encoder. The MPEGimage compressed signal is divided into a variable length sign section683 of an AC component and a fixed length sign section 684 which arerespectively equipped with random number adding sections 686a and 686bfor scrambling. In this embodiment, a scramble release signal of a key687 is enciphered through an cipher encoder 689a. In addition, a portionof a compression program of an image compression control section 689b iscompressed by an cipher encoder 689b. For this reason, it becomesdifficult that the duplication traders replace the cipher encoders.

FIG. 78 illustrates an enciphering arrangement for a parameter of acompression parameter section 691. FIG. 79 is a flow chart for areproducing system. In steps 681a and 681b the cipher encoder on the onedirection function and the cipher are reproduced from a TOC section ofthe optical disk, and in a step 681c the cipher is converted into aplain text by means of a decoder to obtain the physical feature data. Inaddition, the disk physical feature is measured. If OK, the reproductionstarts in a step 681f. Then, a step 681g follows to reproduce the cipherof the scramble key and expansion key, and a step 681h further followsto convert the ciphers and the image expansion program into a plaintext. If a step 681i decides that these are right, a step 681j isimplemented to scramble-release a scramble image signal, and a step 681kis executed to expand a compressed image signal. If a step 681m decidesthat the expansion is correct, the reproduction continues in a step681p.

In the case of this embodiment, it is strictly required to prevent theone direction function cipher encoder from being replaced. In the FIG.79 method, since a portion of the image compression program is encryptedby the same cipher encoder, the replacement of the cipher encoder isimpossible except that the image compression program or compressionparameter is released, thus improving the security.

Thirteenth Embodiment

The thirteenth embodiment relates to a system wherein a plurality ofcipher decoders comprising one direction functions such as an ellipticalfunction is stored in a ROM of a drive and a cipher made by keys of aplurality of cipher encoders is converted into a plain text. This willbe described with reference to a flow chart of FIG. 83. In a step 693aall or a portion of the data contents are enciphered by first to mthsub-cipher encoders to produce Cs1 to Csm. In a step 693b, or in a step693c in the case of recording before TOC, the data including this cipheris recorded in a first recording area of the original record, and in astep 693e the disk physical feature information is measure as describedbefore. Further, in a step 693f the physical feature information andsub-cipher decode information are transmitted through an internetcommunication line to first to nth master encrypting apparatus. In thefirst master cipher center of the first to nth apparatus, the data isreceived in a step 694a and in a step 694b is enciphered in a mainencryption routine. This operation will be described in detail withreference to FIG. 84. A plain text Mn is inputted in a step 695a andcombined (synthesized) with an ID number or the like. In a step 695b,using a one direction function such as the RSA function, it isenciphered by a secrete key of d=512 bits, then followed by a step 695cto output the nth master cipher Cn. After this, the operational flowreturns to a step 694c in FIG. 83 to check whether the n+1th, i.e.,second, master encrypting apparatus is in operation or not. If "YES",the operational flow goes to a step 694d to transmit the first mastercipher C1 to a pressing factory. On the other hand, if "NO", in a step694e the main encryption routine M1 is enciphered using a second cipherencoder 693v the first master cipher center has as a spare, therebyproducing a second master cipher C2. In a step 694f the second mastercipher C2 is transmitted. In a step 693g the first to nth master ciphersare received and in a step 693h they are combined sp as to draw up anintegrated cipher C1. A step 693u follows to check whether the C1 isrecorded in the original record. If "YES", in a step 693i the C1 isrecorded in a second recording area of the original record. On the otherhand, if "NO", the operational flow goes to a step 693j to check whetherthe data contents are recorded or not. If not recorded, the operationalflow advances to a step 693k to record them in a first recording area ofthe original record for the fabrication of the original record, before adisk is made and a reflective film is formed thereon. A step 693q isimplemented to check whether or not the C1 is recorded ion thereflective film. If "YES", the operational flow goes through a step 693rinto a reflective film C1 recording routine. This routine will bedescribed with reference to FIG. 85. A step 696b is executed to checkwhether the physical feature of the reflective film is made or not. If"YES", notches (cut portions) are formed at random in the reflectivefilm by means of a laser trimmer or the like, and the physical featureinformation on the notches are measured in a step 696d. If "NO", theoperational flow advances to a step 696e to check whether or not to usethe master cipher encoder. If "YES", a step 696f is implemented totransmit the physical feature and sub-cipher decode data to perform thefirst to nth master encryptions in the master encryption center. Theyare received in a step 696h, then followed by a step 696k. On the otherhand, if "NO", the operational flow goes to a step 696i to issue theserial number IDd at every disk and encipher the IDd and the physicalinformation by using the mth sub-cipher decoder to make a sub-cipher Cs.Subsequently, in a step 696k the Cs or CR1 to CRn are formed on thereflective film in the form of notches.

Returning back to FIG. 83, a protective layer or magnetic layer isformed in a step 693s and the disk is completed in a step 693t. In thiscase, in the mastering apparatus 529, the description of the externalcipher encoder 579 in the network (FIGS. 1 and 10) is omitted because ithas been described with reference to FIG. 29. Since different n cipherkeys are present on line at different areas in the world, the riskdecreases. In addition, the operation does not start except that all then cipher keys are used for cipher coincidence, thus providing a highdegree of safety.

A description will be made with reference to FIG. 86 in terms of thecipher decoder in the reproduction of this disk. The reproduction of thedisk starts in a step 697a, and the integrated cipher C1 is reproducedin a step 697b and divided into the respective ciphers C1 to Cn in astep 697c which in turn, are converted into plain texts by thecorresponding cipher decoders Dc(n) in the cipher-plain text convertingroutine of a step 697v. After setting of n=0, n is incremented by one ina step 697 before being previously recorded in the ROM section 699 ofthe drive of the personal computer 676 in FIG. 69. The correspondingdecoders are read out from the master cipher decoders DC(1) to DC(n),and the cipher Cn is converted into a plain text. This plain textconversion routine will be described in detail with reference to FIG.87.

In FIG. 87, a step 698a is executed to input the cipher Cn, thenfollowed by a step 698b to convert it into a plain text on the basis ofa one direction function. In the case of RSA, the condition can besatisfied when e is above 3 and n takes a disclosed key above 256 bits.Both are disclosed data. Since in the case of RSA difficulty isexperienced to obtain the encryption function on the basis of thesedecode functions, the secrecy can be maintained. In a step 698c theplain text data Mn is outputted.

Returning back to a step 697h in FIG. 86, checking is made as to whetherthe plain text is correct or not. If "YES", the operational flow goes toa step 697i to check whether n is the last. If the answer of the step697i is "NO", the operational flow returns to the step 697f. If "YES",the operational flow advances to a step 697j to check whether the plaintext data coincidence system for all the ciphers is taken or not. If so,a check is made as to whether or not all the data M1 to Mn are incoincidence. If "NO", the operation stops. If "YES", the operationalflow goes to a step 697m to output the physical feature information andso on. Further, the measured physical feature information data aremeasured in a step 697n so as to be checked with the outputted physicalfeature information in a step 697p. If not coincident therewith, theoperation stops. On the other hand, if "YES", the operation ispermitted. Subsequently, in a step 697r the scramble key enciphered inthe sub-ciphering device is converted into a plain text on the basis ofthe sub-cipher decode information, or the ID number and the sub-cipherof specific data are understood. If the plain text conversion iscorrectly carried out, the operation runs. If not correct, the operationstops.

In this case, the sub-cipher decoder is converted into a plain text bythe master cipher decoder of the ROM of the drive. Accordingly, it ispossible to prevent the illegal duplication traders from replacing thesub-cipher encoder with the decoder for the duplication. In addition,the pirate edition can not operate except that they have the n mastercipher keys and all the keys are leaked. The security drasticallyimproves because of the one direction function cipher key duplicated.

A description will be made with reference to FIGS. 95 and 96 in terms ofthe encryption based on an elliptical function different from the RSAfunction. Roughly describing big routines, a step 735a is executed tomake the first physical feature information, a step 735f is implementedto make the attestation cipher of the first physical featureinformation, a step 735n is executed to attest the first physicalfeature information, and a step 735w is implemented to check the disk.In the step 735a, the disk physical feature is measure in a step 735b toobtain the first physical feature information. The first physicalfeature information is combined with the ID number and sub-cipherdecoder number in a step 735b and compressed in a step 735d. Thecompressed information H is obtained in a step 735e. An attestationnumber is drawn up in a step 735f. First, in a step 735g a secrete key X(X=128 bits or more) is inputted, and in a step 735h a disclosed systemparameter G is determined at a point on an elliptical curve and f(x) isset as a one direction function and k is set to be a secrete randomnumber. In this case, R=f (Gk) is obtained and R'=f (R) is then obtainedso that in a step 735i the attestation ciphers R and S are produced inaccordance with an equation S=(K×R'-H)X-1 modQ. In a step 735j theattestation ciphers R, S and the plain text H including the firstphysical feature information are recorded on a disk or original record.The disk is put on the market in a step 735k.

On the other hand, in the reproducing system side, a step 735m isexecuted such that the disk is mounted, and in a step 735p theattestation ciphers R, S and plain text H are reproduced. Further, in astep q the disclosed parameters G, Q are obtained, and in a step 735r adisclosed key Y of more than 128 bits is inputted, and further thedecode calculation is performed. The calculations of A=SR-1 modQ andB=HR-1 modQ are performed under the condition of Y=Gx. In a step 735t,the calculation of R=f(YAGB) is performed so as to check whether or notthe right- and left-hand sides are coincident with each other. If "NO",in a step 735u a decision is made such that it is a duplicated disk,then followed by a step 735v to stop the operation. If "YES", since itindicates that the plain text is nore revised, the operational flow goesto a step 735w in FIG. 96 to expand the plain text H. Subsequently, astep 736b is implemented to output the first physical featureinformation, ID number and sub-cipher decoder number and a step 736c isexecuted to measure the disk physical feature to obtain the secondphysical feature information. In a step 736d, the first and secondphysical feature information are checked in the checking section, and ina step 736e a coincidence decision is made therebetween. If "NO", theoperational flow goes to a step 736f to display "duplicated disk" andthen to a step 736g to stop the program. On the other hand, if "YES",the operational flow advances to a step 736h to execute the program oroutput the reproduced data. In the case of the elliptical function, theplain text of the first physical feature information and attestationcipher are sent, whereby it is possible to reduce the cipher decode timebecause the data amount of the attestation cipher is small. Thedisclosed key cipher system is described in detail by "Elliptic CurveCryptosystems", written by Kobliz, N., Mat h Comp. 48(1987), pp.203-209.

Fourteenth Embodiment!

A description will be made with reference to FIGS. 88A, 88B and a flowchart of FIG. 89 in terms of the fourteenth embodiment relating to amethod of recording the cipher information for the pirate editionprevention in a second recording area 708 in which TOC and so on arerecorded in the fabricating process of an optical disk original record.FIG. 88A shows a state in which a signal is recorded a first recordingarea 707 of an original record 700a which is for chiefly recordingprogram softs or image signals. In the case of the common CD or LD, TOCis provided at an inner circumferential portion and the recording startsfrom the inner circumferential portion. However, in this invention, arecording signal outputting section 723 generates a signal in adirection opposite to the time-axis direction unlike the direction ofthe common signal. Accordingly, in a step 711b of the flow chart of FIG.89, the optical head 6 records the signal from an outer circumferentialportion and tracking-controlled toward an inner circumferential portionso that spirally arranged pits (a first recording line 709) are recordedin the first recording area 707. At this time, in the masteringapparatus, a rotational angle detecting section 17a of a motor 17generates rotational angle data with high accuracy and a recordingsignal outputting section 723 outputs data such as addresses,Accordingly, These data are simulation-treated in a physical featuremeasuring section 703. Thus, a CPU 724 can simulate, in units ofsubmicrons, the formation of the pits on the original record. In a step711c all the physical feature information on the original record aremeasured, and in a step 711d the measurement is made as to how each pithaving a given relation to an address takes an angular position on theoriginal record so as to extract the feature section which is extremelydifficult to duplicate. It is also appropriate to take the informationmerely indicative of the angle of the pit in a given address. Moreover,when an area in which the pits of the adjacent tracks accidentallyassume the same pit table and pit arrangement is found, it is possiblethat the angular position or address position, track number and inphasepit data train are used as the physical feature information. Thephysical feature information has repeatedly been described above withreference to FIGS. 10, 18, 20, 38 and 43, and the description thereof isomitted.

In a step 711e, the ID number or sub-cipher decode data is combined withthe physical feature information and fed to a plurality of encryptiondevices (step 694), which data is received by the nth encryption devicein a step 694i to be enciphered in a step 694j, the resulting cipherbeing transmitted in a step 694k. This routine is shown in FIGS. 83 and84, and omitted. In a subsequent step 711f, the ciphers C1 to Cnenciphered by the one direction function cipher encoder 537 arereceived, and in a step 711g the ciphers C1 to Cn are synthesized andfurther combined with the second recording signal, the resulting signalbeing made in a recording signal processing section 723 in FIG. 88A tobe subsequent to the first recording signal. The recording section 37records pits at an inner circumferential portion of the original record700b, which contains TOC and so on, so as to form a second recordingline 710 spirally directing to the inner circumferential side. Therecording is completed in a step 711h.

It is common that the original record is made from the innercircumferential side to the outer circumferential side, i.e., in thereproducing direction. Contrary to this, in this invention the time-axisdirection of the recording signal is reversed so that the recording ismade from the outer circumferential side to the inner circumferentialside for the fabrication of the original record, and further the pirateedition preventing signal is finally recorded thereon. This method makesit possible to form pits successively arranged as one track. This canrealize the pirate edition prevention in conformity with the standard ofa CD or the like.

The reproducing operation will be described with reference to a blockdiagram of an information precessing system of FIG. 90 and areproduction flow chart of FIG. 91. In a step 712a, the second recordingarea 708 including the TOC area and others is reproduced, as well as thecase of CD. Subsequently, in a step 712b the first to nth ciphers C1 toCn and information such as TOC are reproduced and in a step 712c theciphers C1 to Cn are converted into plain texts by the first to nthcipher decoders 534a, 534b, 534c, which are fixed keys in the ROM 699 ofthe master cipher decoder 534, in accordance with the cipher decoderoutine 698 in FIG. 87, thus obtaining M1 to Mn. In a step 712d, M1 toMn, i.e., physical feature information, sub-cipher decode information,and ID number are outputted from a plain-text information outputtingsection 714. A step 712e follows to check, in a plain text data checkingsection 715, whether all or a portion of M1 to Mn are coincident or not.If the answer of a step 712f is OK, the operational flow goes to a step712g. If the answer of the step 712f is "NO", the operational flow goesto a step 713 to execute a stopping routine. In this routine, in a step713a the CPU 665 displays "duplicated disk" on the display section 16,and in steps 713b and 713c, a program/reproducing operation stoppingsection 717 stops the program or reproducing operation.

On the other hand, if "YES", the reproduction starts in a step 712g,then followed by a step 712h to obtain the address, rotational angle andlow-reflection section of the disk by a physical feature measuringsection 703a. Further, an off-track instruction signal is given to atracking control section 24 so that a light beam travels between thetracks to obtain a crosstalk signal, thereby detecting the inphasesignal and obtaining a data train. The measured physical featureinformation of the first recording area 707 or the second recording area708 is obtained in this way. This method has been described before withreference to FIG. 18 or others, and the description thereof is omitted.In a step 712i, the physical feature information checking section 535checks the measured physical feature information with the physicalfeature information. If a step 712j decide "no coincidence", theoperational flow goes to a step 713d, i.e., the foregoing stoppingroutine 713. On the other hand, if "OK", the operational flow advancesto a step 712k so that a program/reproducing operation allowing section722 continues the reproduction or allows the operation of the program.

In a step 712m, checking is made as to whether or not to use thesub-cipher decoder. If "NO", the operational flow jumps to a step 712rto output the data. If "YES", steps 712n and 712p are executed toreproduce the encryption signal in the first recording area to convertit into a plain text. Or the scramble release key added to the variablelength sign section 683, which has been described with reference to FIG.77, is enciphered through this sub-cipher and the scramble signal isrecorded in the optical disk. In addition, in the step 681h of thereproduction flow chart of FIG. 79, the scramble release key isdescrambled by the sub-cipher decoder in FIG. 91, whereby the user ofthe legal disk can reproduce the complete image. On the other hand,since the illegally duplicated disk can not be descrambled, only thevariable length signal component, i.e., the poor image not having ahigh-frequency component, is reproducible. Further, in a step 712q, theplain text data due to the sub-cipher or the image signal obtained bydescrambling the scrambled image signal is outputted and in a step 712rthe final data is outputted from the outputting section.

As shown in FIGS. 88A and 88B, the time axis (base) of the recordingdata is reversed so that the recording is made from the outercircumferential side to the inner circumferential side for thefabrication of the original record, realizing an addition type pirateedition preventing disk with one spiral track. Thus, since the addeddata can be reproduced by the ordinary optical head without the changeof the standard, the structure becomes simplified.

As described above, according to this invention, it is possible torealize media having a magnetic recording section on its surfaceopposite to its optical recording surface while having the standard ofCDs and the like, and further to realize a recording and reproducingsystem which provides reliability in the home-use environment at a costreasonable for the home-use. In addition, since the disk physical ID isenciphered by a one-direction function cipher encoder, it is possible toimprove the degree of security for duplication prevention.

What is claimed is:
 1. An information reproducing system comprisingmeans (17) for rotationally driving a disc-like optical recording medium(2) wherein information is recorded in a recording layer in the form ofpits, an optical head (6) for reading out the recorded information fromsaid optical recording medium, head-moving means (23) for making saidoptical head movable radially on said optical recording medium, andsignal processing means for processing the information read out throughsaid optical head, which system is characterized by including:firstphysical information detecting means (743, 38, 665) for detecting, onthe basis of information read out through one of said optical head and amagnetic head, first physical feature information (532) which isrepresentative of at least one of information of a two-dimensionalphysical arrangement of a pit or low-reflection section and aconfiguration of said pit or low-reflection section of said recordinglayer on said optical recording medium and which is enciphered andrecorded at manufacture of said optical recording medium; decryptionmeans (534) for decoding the first physical feature information into aplain text using disclosed key cipher system cipher function (695b,698B, 735h); means (17a, 6, 38, 703a) for measuring a physical featureof said optical recording medium to detect second physical featureinformation indicative of at least one of information of a physicalarrangement of said pit or low-reflection section and a configuration ofsaid pit or low-reflection section; check means (535) for checking saidsecond physical feature information with said first physical featureinformation already decoded into a plain text to make a decision as towhether or not both are in a specific relation to each other; andcontrol means (717, 665) for, when the check means decides that saidsecond physical feature information is not in the specific relation tosaid first physical feature information, stopping one of an operation ofa specific program read out from said optical recording medium, asubsequent reading-out of information from said optical recordingmedium, and a given process of information, read out from the opticalrecording medium, the given process being practiced by said signalprocessing means.
 2. A system as defined in claim 1, characterized inthat reproducing means detects, on the basis of an internal pressure ofpits, a first low-reflection section (740) in which a reflected lightquantity is small and a high-reflection section (741) in which areflectance is higher than that of said first reflection section due toa portion with no pit, and in an apparatus for reproducing a firstoptical recording signal, second low-reflection section detecting means(586) detects a second low-reflection section (584) provided in anoptical recording signal area (742) and having a reflectance lower thanthat of said first low-reflection section and providing a reflectedlight quantity smaller than that of said first low-reflection section,and said second physical feature information detecting means obtainssaid second physical feature information on the basis of a detectionsignal of said second low-reflection section detecting means.
 3. Asystem as defined in claim 2, characterized in that said secondlow-reflection section detecting means detects said secondlow-reflection section by slicing said first optical recording signal ata first slice level of a first level slicer (386) of level slicershaving two or more slice levels and by slicing a reproduced signal at asecond slice level of a second level slicer (586) which corresponds to alight quantity smaller than a light quantity for said first slice level.4. A system as defined in claim 3, characterized by further comprisingsecond low-reflection section position detecting means (696) fordetecting at least one of a position, circumferential length andcircumferential interval of said second low-reflection section on thebasis of a second low-reflection section detection signal of said secondlow-reflection section detecting means (586) and a first opticalreproduced signal detected by reproducing means (590).
 5. A system asdefined in claim 4, characterized in that a time correction section(607) measures a time interval between a reference mark detection signaldetected by a mark signal detecting means (593) and a reference secondreflective section detection signal detected by said secondlow-reflection section detecting means (586) to obtain a referencecorrection time, and further said time correction section (607) correctsa time interval between a specific mark signal detection signal and asecond reflective section detection signal on the basis of saidreference correction time, before said second low-reflection sectionposition detecting means (596) detects a position of said secondreflective section detection signal.
 6. A system as defined in claim 4,characterized in that, when a mark signal detecting section (593)detects a specific mark signal of said first optical reproduced signal,said second low-reflection section position detecting means (596)detects one of said position, said circumferential length and saidcircumferential interval of said second low-reflection section on thebasis of a mark detection signal of said mark signal detecting section.7. A system as defined in claim 6, characterized in that said marksignal detecting section (593) detects an address signal as said marksignal.
 8. A system as defined in claim 7, characterized in that saidsecond low-reflection section position detecting means (596) detects oneof said position, said circumferential length and said circumferentialinterval of said second low-reflection section on the basis of saidaddress signal and the number of reproduction clock signal counted by acounter (598).
 9. A system as defined in claim 8, characterized in thatsaid second low-reflection section position detecting means (596)detects said position of said second low-reflection section on the basisof said address signal, the number of frame synchronizing signalscounted by said counter (598) and the number of said reproductionsignals counted by said counter (598).
 10. A system as defined in claim7, characterized in that said second low-reflection section positiondetecting means (596) detects said position of said secondlow-reflection section on the basis of an address signal of said firstoptical reproduced signal and a frame synchronizing signal.
 11. A systemas defined in claim 7, characterized in that said second low-reflectionsection position detecting means (596) detects one of said position,said circumferential length and said circumferential interval of saidsecond low-reflection section with the number of reproduced clocks of asynchronizing signal reproducing means (38a) which obtained from saidfirst optical reproduced being counted by a counter (598).
 12. A systemas defined in claim 11, characterized in that said synchronizing signalreproducing means detects as a synchronizing signal a clock signal froma synchronizing clock reproducing means (38a) of an EFM demodulatingmeans (592).
 13. A system as defined in claim 6, characterized in thatsaid mark signal detecting section (593) detects, as said mark signal, aspecific signal of a sub-code signal of a CD.
 14. A system as defined inclaim 2, characterized in that said second low-reflection sectiondetecting means (586) detects only said second low-reflection sectionlonger than said first low-reflection section in a tracking direction.15. A system as defined in claim 2, characterized in that said secondphysical feature information detecting means obtains said secondphysical feature information by detecting an angular position of saidsecond low-reflection section on said recording medium on the basis of afirst detection signal on said second low-reflection section detected bysaid second low-reflection section detecting means (586) and a seconddetection signal detected by an angle detecting means (355) of rotatingmeans.
 16. A system as defined in claim 2, characterized in that saidsecond physical feature information detecting means obtains said secondphysical feature information by measuring start and end positions ofsaid second low-reflection section on the basis of a secondlow-reflection section detection signal detected by said secondlow-reflection section detecting means (586) and at least one of a framesynchronizing signal and clock signal of a first optical reproducedsignal detected by an optical reproducing means (590).